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This dissertation develops three essays on safe haven currency behavior and
international monetary interactions.
Essay one notes the dramatic appreciation of the U.S. dollar vis-à-vis all world
currencies, along with its reversal after a year on the account of the Great Recession. This
paper investigates bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate movements during and in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. I find that increasing global market uncertainty has a
significant and consistent effect in strengthening of the U.S. dollar. This striking finding
suggests flight-to-safety phenomenon of foreign investors, and repatriation of capital
flows to the United States by the U.S. investors during and after the last financial crisis.
This essay also demonstrates that global investors consider the 3-month and 1-year T-bill,
the 5-year T-note, and the 20-year T-bond as the strongest safe haven instruments that
can be bought and sold in U.S. dollars.
In essay two, it is noted that existing literature assumes that the euro is a safe
haven currency but there is no evidence whether it actually behaves as a safe haven. This
essay studies the validity of the safe haven hypothesis for the euro. A safe haven currency
works as a hedge in the face of extreme market uncertainty. The results of this research
imply that the euro is a safe haven currency if the market uncertainty originates in the

U.S. market. I show that there is no significant evidence to suggest that the euro serves as
a safe haven currency if the uncertainty originates in the Euro-area. From the standpoint
of world investors, however, this paper does not find any Euro-area safe haven asset
(other than cash) using the EURO STOXX 50 Index as a measure of uncertainty.
Essay three studies whether the European Central Bank or the Federal Reserve
have an influence on monetary policy implementations of each other and other major
industrialized countries since the advent of the euro. I find that the Federal Reserve
causes an endogenous monetary policy response in the Euro-area, and in other non-US
G7 countries, with the exception of Japan, during the conventional monetary policy
period of the post-euro era. I also show that exogenous Euro-area conventional monetary
policy innovations cause foreign monetary policy endogeneity in Canada and the UK, but
do not cause similar endogeneity in the US and Japan. I define foreign monetary policy
endogeneity as the reaction of G7 monetary authorities (that persists for at least two time
periods) following a monetary policy innovation of the other. The results of this chapter
further reveal that, with respect to the G7 economies, U.S. unconventional monetary
policy shocks induce endogenous policy reactions only in Japan during the Great
Recession and its aftermath. Unconventional monetary policy innovations by the
European Central Bank, instead, lead to a response by the monetary authorities of Japan,
the UK, and the US.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The rapid appreciation of the U.S. dollar (USD) against all world currencies at the start of
the Great Recession, together with its reversal after a year stands out as a remarkable event. This
appreciation of the USD in 2007 was as sharp as any in the period since the floating exchange
rate regime started in 1973. This appreciation was not expected given that the Great Recession
originated in the United States (Fratzscher, 2009; McCauley & McGuire, 2009; Habib & Stracca,
2012). The appreciation stands out because it defied the consensus at the time, as Mozayani &
Parvizi (2016) argue, that the USD would depreciate to improve U.S. competitiveness due to
large global imbalances in U.S. current account positions. In the first chapter of this dissertation,
I investigate whether safe haven behavior (the idea that the dollar and-dollar denominated
“assets” were considered safe or safer “assets” in comparison to the available alternatives) is a
possible explanation for the performance of the U.S. dollar since the Great Recession. The major
indicator for market uncertainty is the volatility of the stock market, which I used to determine
the instigator of safe haven flows on the USD exchange rate. Following the literature, I included
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as the main volatility indicator. I
also used the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) as another measure of uncertainty
to further examine the reaction of the USD to uncertainty during the Great Recession and in its
aftermath. Using the VSTOXX as another measure of uncertainty is one of the more important
contribution of this dissertation to the current literature.
VIX and the VSTOXX may contain different information, even though they appear to
measure the same phenomena and employ similar calculation techniques. The VIX and the
VSTOXX, as indicators of volatility, are also important variables incorporated in the main
1

hypotheses of interest for the first chapter, because a researcher can use them to determine the
impact of safe haven flows on the USD. I explored whether they are correlated to the USD
exchange rates to detect safe haven behavior. In the first chapter, I investigated the influence of
safe haven behavior in the movements of the nominal USD exchange rate (against thirty-three
currencies) by controlling for relevant macroeconomic fundamentals. I found that there is a
positive and significant relationship between the VIX and USD at the time of Great Recession,
and also during the post-crisis period. This result means that the USD appreciates when the U.S.
market uncertainty increases. This positive and significant relationship between the value of the
dollar and market uncertainty as reflected by the VIX implies flight-to-safety phenomenon of
foreign investors, and repatriation of capital flows to the United States by U.S. investors. To the
contrary, I demonstrated that the European stock market volatility does not have any impact on
the value of the USD, because there is no significant relationship between the VSTOXX and the
USD in the Great Recession and its aftermath. This finding serves as the motivation and starting
point for my second chapter, because the Euro-area sovereign debt crisis kept uncertainty high
while the US was trying to get back to normal terms.
I further explored the similarities and differences between the US and Euro-area (EA) for
a couple of reasons. First, a motivating factor for construction of the common currency and joint
monetary policy was to have the euro serve as a counterpart to the U.S. dollar (Krugman et al.,
2012). To what extent has this taken place? Some completed research (Fatum & Yamamoto,
2016; Fatum et al., 2017) claim that the euro is a safe haven currency without any supporting
empirical evidence. Studies like Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) argue that the euro, appear to have
safe haven properties, but the results were weak for the euro providing motivation for further
investigation of these properties. I, therefore, explored the safe haven behavior of euro since its
2

advent as the single European currency. I used the VSTOXX as the main indicator of market
uncertainty, along with the VIX as another source of market volatility in the second chapter of
this dissertation. I applied the same methodology used in the first chapter, and found that the
euro is a safe haven as long as the source of uncertainty is not the EA, and is instead originating
in the US. While I found that an increase in the U.S. sourced market uncertainty appreciated the
euro during the Great Recession and its aftermath. I did not find similar result when the market
uncertainty originated in the EA, rather demonstrated that world investors appear to move away
from the euro while the EA sourced market uncertainty rises.
After finding evidence that the USD and euro serve as safe havens in the Great Recession
and its aftermath, I studied safe haven instruments (that can be bought and sold in the USD and
euro) to determine which of these instruments are chosen by world investors. Following the
methodologies of Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur & McDermott (2016), and Hood & Malik (2013)
in my first chapter, I found that VSTOXX futures, the one-year T-bill, five-year T-Note and
twenty-year T-Bond are other safe haven possibilities for investors if the S&P 500 Index
performs lower than the first-percentage-quantile of its return distribution. I also showed that the
3-months T-bill is chosen as another safe haven if the U.S. stock market return is lower than the
five-percentage quantile of the return distribution of S&P 500 Index. However, the second
chapter of this dissertation demonstrated that none of the EA government bonds are considered
as a safe haven asset at periods of extreme negative returns of the EURO STOXX 50 Index.
Having compared the U.S. and EA currencies as being safe haven during the time of
Great Recession and afterwards, I explore monetary policies of these economies to determine
whether the European Central Bank (ECB) or the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) have an influence
on monetary policy implementations of each other. Kim (2001) analyzed this relationship during
3

the pre-euro period and found that G6 monetary authorities did not respond to U.S. monetary
policy shocks. Following Kim (2001) in the third chapter, I investigated the transmission of the
U.S. and E.A. monetary policy decisions on each other’s, and on other major industrialized
countries’ (Canada, Japan, and the UK) monetary policy implementations since the advent of the
euro. I also studied the post-euro period and tested whether the ECB is more resilient to U.S.
monetary policy shocks compared to the pre-euro period. The results of this chapter demonstrate
that conventional contractionary monetary policy shocks of the Fed cause foreign policy
endogeneity in the Euro-area and in other non-US G7 economies. However, conventional
contractionary monetary policy innovations of the ECB only lead to an endogenous monetary
policy implementation in Canada and the U.K. I also showed that U.S. unconventional monetary
expansions only cause an endogenous monetary policy action on Japan.
The findings of my third chapter reveal that expansionary Euro-area unconventional
monetary policy shocks lead to endogenous responses by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of
England, and the Bank of Japan. Therefore, there is significant evidence to suggest that the EA
becomes stronger during the Great Recession and its aftermath (2009-2015) in the third chapter
of this dissertation. This result offers some evidence that the EA becomes successful in terms of
becoming a counterpart to the US during the unconventional monetary policy period (20092015), while there is little evidence for the same claim before the Great Recession.
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CHAPTER 2
BILATERAL U.S. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES AND SAFE HAVEN BEHAVIOR
My research analyzes U.S. dollar exchange movements against thirty-three currencies
during and after the Great Recession.1 Following Kaul & Sapp (2006) and Habib & Stracca
(2012), my paper begins with traditional definition of safe haven currency as one that serves as a
hedge with respect to market uncertainty. Investors from around the world buy assets
denominated in currencies considered to be safe havens because they appear more attractive than
others when uncertainty rises (Kohler, 2010). Investors appeared to consider the United States as
a safe haven although the United States was at the core of the last financial crisis.
In this study, I demonstrate that safe haven behavior is a possible explanation for the
performance of the U.S. dollar since the Great Recession. Such behavior appears to be an
investment strategy in the face of global uncertainty. Safe haven flows are observed in the
movements of the nominal U.S. dollar exchange rate when I also control for relevant
macroeconomic fundamentals.
The striking appreciation of the U.S. dollar in 2007 was as sharp as any in the period
since the floating exchange rate regime started in 1973. The U.S. dollar appreciation at the
beginning of the last financial crisis becomes a distinctive feature of the Great Recession
(Fratzscher, 2009; McCauley & McGuire, 2009; Habib & Stracca, 2012). This U.S. dollar
strengthening surprised many observers because, as Mozayani & Parvizi (2016) state, before the

1

These economies are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Denmark, the Euro
area, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and
the UK.
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crisis, there was a consensus that the U.S. dollar (USD) would depreciate.2 The common belief
was that a large depreciation was necessary to improve U.S. competitiveness due to large global
imbalances in U.S. current account (CA) positions. The U.S. economy had been running current
account deficits since the third quarter of 1991 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2017).
However, the actual pattern of the U.S. dollar was very different from what was expected.
Following Habib & Stracca (2012) and Fatum & Yamamoto (2016), the Chicago Board
Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) is the main indicator of volatility used to detect the
effect of market uncertainty on the behavior of the U.S. dollar in this research. The Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) (2015) defines the VIX as a forward-looking predictor for the
variability of future market changes, because it measures expected volatility by averaging the
weighted prices of the S&P 500 Index puts and calls over a wide range of strike prices. 3 The VIX
estimates 30-day expected volatility of the S&P 500 Index by calculating the midpoint of realtime S&P 500 Index option bid and ask quotes. The VIX aims to record an instantaneous
measure of the level of implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index over the next 30 days. Therefore,
the VIX is an up-to-the-minute estimate of market uncertainty, and the CBOE calculates it
approximately every 15 seconds (CBOE, 2016).4

2

Kohler (2010) states that the depreciation of many non-USD currencies, which are at the core of the crisis, differs
from two previous financial crisis episodes, namely, the Asian crisis of 1997-98, and the Russian debt default of
1998 that followed it. Following his approach, in Figure 2, in the Appendix, I show the movement of some
currencies that are included in this study. The depreciation of non-USD currencies contrasts with the previous
episodes, because during the Asian crisis, Indonesia and South Korea (at the epicenter of the Asian crisis)
experienced sharp depreciations while the others experienced small changes. Similarly, in the Russian debt default
episode, South Africa and Chile (also at the epicenter of the Russian debt default due to their exposure) had
reasonably large declines.
3
The strike of an option is the price at which a put (where the option can be bought) and a call (where the option can
be sold) option can be applied. It is also called the exercise price.
4
Whaley (1993) discusses the purpose and history of the VIX and states that the volatility index level equals the
volatility futures price.
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To further explore the performance of the USD in this special era, I employ the EURO
STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) as another measure of uncertainty. STOXX (2018)
introduces the VSTOXX as the implied volatility across all EURO STOXX 50 options of a given
time to expiration.5 STOXX (2018) describes the VSTOXX calculation as a direct replication of
variance.6 The VSTOXX uses a similar averaging method for real-time bid and ask prices over a
large EURO STOXX 50 portfolio with different exercise prices and weighting. Nonetheless,
these volatility indices might contain different information, even though they appear to measure
same thing. Figure 1, in the Appendix, demonstrates that time plots of the two indices do not
necessarily move in sync. Shore (2017) argues that global investors consider the VSTOXX/VIX
spread as an additional information to hedge their portfolios.
The VIX and the VSTOXX, as indicators of volatility, are also important variables
incorporated in the main hypotheses of interest for my paper, because a researcher can use them
to detect safe haven behavior by observing whether they are correlated to exchange rates. In
other words, a change in market uncertainty (measured by movements in the VIX and VSTOXX)
may induce variation of investor’s preferences towards different currencies which are then
reflected in exchange rate movements. For instance, if a rise in the VIX is related to appreciation
of the U.S. dollar (USD), then this suggests that investors use the USD as a hedge against market
uncertainty, and thus the USD is a safe haven currency. Considering the above, I explore the role

5

The purpose and calculation of the VSTOXX is similar to the VIX. The derivation of the VIX and the VSTOXX
are further detailed in the Appendix.
6
The S&P 500 and EURO STOXX 50 indices represent the performance of the largest companies in terms of freefloat market capitalization. The S&P 500 Index consists of stocks of 500 companies, whereas the EURO STOXX 50
Index includes largest 50 companies in 11 original members of the Euro-area. These countries are Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Both of these volatility
indices use free-float market cap methodology in which large companies get higher weighting.
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of global market uncertainty on the unusual pattern of the U.S. dollar exchange rate during and
after the most recent financial crisis.
Literature Review
Standard models can be used to account for exchange rates during tranquil periods, but
do not serve us well if there is a crisis. Fratzscher (2009) argues that determinants of exchange
rates might be fundamentally different in crises periods compared to normal times. Other factors,
such as global uncertainty, become very crucial for explaining currency movements. Fatum &
Yamamoto (2016) discuss that market uncertainty is an important factor in understanding; and
modeling exchange rate movements, because it can have an impact on currency behavior in a
systematic fashion. Thus, explaining safe haven behavior becomes very crucial to analyze
exchange rate movements.
The empirical literature on safe haven behavior can be divided into two parts. One uses
low-frequency data and the other high-frequency data. Here, low-frequency data is defined as
data that is at monthly or longer time intervals. High-frequency is data at shorter than monthly
intervals (e.g. daily data). Fratzscher (2009), Habib & Stracca (2012), Kohler (2010) are the most
striking examples in the sphere of low-frequency (monthly or quarterly) data. Fratzscher (2009)
examines global foreign exchange (FX) movements in 2008 and 2009 by empirically
investigating the determinants of bilateral exchange rate movements vis-à-vis the USD for 54
currencies. The author runs a cross-sectional regression in which all determinants of the
exchange rate are measured prior to the financial crisis. Fratzscher (2009) finds that countries
with large CA deficits, a low level of foreign currency assets, and higher financial liabilities visà-vis the United States have experienced significantly larger depreciations against the USD.
Fratzscher (2009) also tests the transmission of U.S. shocks before and during the crisis. His
8

paper offers that negative news shocks during the crisis caused an appreciation of the USD,
whereas before the Great Recession, negative US macroeconomic news led to a depreciation of
the USD. Additionally, this research reports that a repatriation of capital to the US by domestic
investors, flight-to-safety behavior by world investors, and unwinding carry trade flows may be
reasons for the appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the second half of 2008, and early 2009.
However, these hypotheses are not tested directly in his analysis, Fratzscher (2009) rather
attempts to examine these effects on exchange rates by investigating countries’ macroeconomic
fundamentals and financial exposure to the United States.
Habib & Stracca (2012) investigate the fundamental determinants of being a safe haven
currency by examining 51 bilateral exchange rates against the US dollar from January 1986 to
December 2009. The paper identifies a measure of global risk aversion shocks from applying
sign restrictions to a bi-variate vector autoregressive model. The authors define this shock as a
condition in which the VIX increases, and the return on a global unhedged stock market portfolio
decreases.7 This study interacts this shock with relevant domestic variables while putting
monthly USD-based excess returns as the dependent variable. The authors find that the net
foreign asset position is the most consistent predictor of safe haven status, because it turns out to
be positively and significantly related to the appreciation of the U.S. dollar in periods of global
volatility (in all possible specifications of the paper). Nonetheless, they rely frequently on data
interpolation techniques due to data unavailability at the monthly frequency. Hence, interpolation
techniques are the major downside of this study, as Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) emphasize.

7

Habib & Stracca (2012) measure the return on a global unhedged stock market portfolio by the Modern Index
Strategy (MSCI) world stock market index.
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Kohler’s (2010) research takes a different approach and compares the last three major
financial crises: the Asian crisis, the Russian debt default, and the Great Recession. The author
maintains that the depreciation of some currencies against the USD quickly and strongly
reversed within a year after the start of the last financial crisis. This aspect of the most recent
crisis is more surprising than the appreciation of the USD, because similar reversals spread over
years in the previous financial crises.
In addition, Kohler (2010) claims that there are two common elements across the crises,
which can explain exchange rate movements. First, the author argues that the rise and the fall in
uncertainty seems correlated to exchange rate changes. Her study shows that one-month implied
volatility of currencies against the USD increased sharply as the latest crisis intensified. Second,
this paper discusses that interest rate differentials have more explanatory power of the crisisrelated exchange rate movements than in the past. The author plots crisis-related appreciations of
33 currencies vis-à-vis the Japanese yen over the two months following the particular crisis
episode against the average short-term interest rates in the previous six months and the average
contemporaneous short-term interest rates. Her findings support unwinding carry trade activities,
and the currencies with the highest short-term interest rates depreciate the most in the period
prior to the crisis. She also states that the channel between higher interest rates of currencies and
exchange rate depreciations during the Great Recession is stronger than in previous crises
incidents. Her research claims that the rise in carry trade activities over the past 15 years could
be a reason for this finding.
Instead of using monthly, quarterly, or yearly (low-frequency) data, another set of
researchers use data that is of higher frequency such as daily, minute-by-minute and even
second-by-second. Examples include Ranaldo & Soderling, 2010; Hossfeld & MacDonald, 2015;
10

Fatum & Yamamoto, 2016. Having sorted the data according to the VIX levels, these highfrequency data articles use the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as the
main indicator of market uncertainty in threshold regressions. This part of the safe haven
literature tries to determine which conventionally assumed safe-haven currencies serve as a
hedge on average or in times of stress.8 These articles determine the threshold values of the VIX
as high and low regimes. After determining the threshold values, these studies argue that
conventionally assumed safe-haven currencies are able to be compared with each other. Their
purpose is specially to detect the market uncertainty threshold around which safe haven flows
might change. In this way, these articles aim to test whether the relationship between the flightto-safety behavior and market uncertainty depends on a particular level of uncertainty (Ranaldo
& Soderling, 2010; Hossfeld & MacDonald, 2015; Fatum & Yamamoto, 2016).
For instance, Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) examine some currencies considered to be safe
havens, and investigate safe haven currency behavior before, during, and after the Great
Recession. The authors analyze the exchange rates of the USD vis-à-vis the Swiss franc, the
Japanese yen, the Great Britain pound, the euro, the Canadian dollar and the Swedish krona.
First, this study finds that the yen and franc experienced significant appreciation against the USD
during the Great Recession. Second, Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) concentrate on a non-linear
analysis with endogenously identified uncertainty thresholds separately for each bilateral USD
exchange rate to determine whether safe haven behavior changes when the VIX rises above a
certain level. The authors observe that increases in uncertainty (measured using increases in the
VIX) do not seem to affect currency values unless those increases are above a certain level.

8

These currencies are the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Swiss franc, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Canadian
dollar, the Swedish krona, the Australian dollar, the Norwegian krone.
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Below that uncertainty level, the exchange rate does not respond to increased uncertainty. These
findings hold for the pound, the euro, and the krona. Nevertheless, these currencies depreciate
significantly against the USD when the VIX is higher than the currency specific threshold. In
contrast, Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) demonstrate that the yen appreciates as the VIX increases
regardless of whether the increase in uncertainty is small or large. The authors find no specific
uncertainty threshold in the case of yen. Their findings also show that after the last financial
crisis, the yen still strengthened against the USD, while other currencies depreciate vis-à-vis the
USD. As a result, Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) suggest that the yen is better than the U.S. dollar
in terms of being a safe haven currency.
Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) try to answer the same research question as Fatum &
Yamamoto (2016). However, Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) include a carry trade channel, and
employ different risk variables for a sample from January 1993 to December 2008.9 Ranaldo &
Soderling’s (2010) results reveal that the franc, euro, yen have safe haven properties while the
pound does not.
Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) explore whether G10 currencies should be considered as
safe haven currencies at the time of a crisis, because carry trade flows are less likely to happen.
The authors use threshold regressions in which the VIX determines the high and low regimes for
the period January 1986 to September 2012. However, their model includes the Modern Index
Strategy (MSCI) world index as the stock return, and the old version VIX (the VXO) as the

9

These risk variables are the VIX, the TED spread, foreign exchange volatility. The TED spread is the difference
between the USD LIBOR rate and the T-bill rate. Their definition for the FX volatility is the first principal
component of the realized volatilities of euro, yen, and pound vis-à-vis USD in logs. Ranaldo & Soderling (2010)
find that the FX volatility and the VIX (for the yen only) are only significant risk variables.
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market uncertainty threshold variable.10 Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) show that the U.S. dollar
and the Swiss franc are the only safe havens out of G10 exchange rates.
There are two important conclusions that emerge from the safe haven literature. The
qualification of the USD as a safe haven currency regardless of the frequency data used is the
primary conclusion. In addition, there is significant support for finding other currencies (such as
the yen, the franc, and the euro) serve as safe havens. Lastly, the VIX, CA, FX reserves, the net
foreign asset position (NFA) are the variables that are most commonly used to assign safe haven
currency behavior. I chose not to incorporate NFA into my model, because a transformation of
NFA might constitute current account balance.11
My study adds important value to the current literature for many reasons. First, my article
includes the volatility index for European stock prices (the VSTOXX) as another indicator for
market uncertainty, because it might contain a different set of information. It is hard to examine
the validity of safe haven behavior, because there are not individual volatility indices for every
country’s stock market. Thus, employing the European volatility index to explain safe haven
behavior is new approach in the existing literature. However, my article does not find any
significant impact of the VSTOXX on the value of USD exchange rate.

10

Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) identify high threshold uncertainty period as a crisis episode, which is defined
according to a threshold value of the VXO (the old VIX that is based on the S&P 100 Index). Their threshold value
of the VXO minimizes the sum of squared errors function.
11
The net international investment position (NIIP) is also called as net foreign assets (NFA). Tille (2003) argues that
the U.S. net international investment position (which is also referred as the net foreign asset position) could change
with only changes in their current stocks of U.S. assets and liabilities. The IMF (2014) defines NIIP as the
subtraction of gold reserves and financial assets of a country’s residents in another economy from liabilities of those
residents to non-residents. According to Lane & Shambaugh’s (2010) conceptual framework, the change in net
foreign assets (also equals NIIP) can be modeled as (NFA) t - (NFA)t-1 = (Current Account)t + (Valuation Effects).
For this reason, my model only incorporates the current account balance as a regressor.
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I further contribute to the existing literature by investigating the U.S. dollar exchange rate
movements during the crisis period and its aftermath. I do not only focus on the period of the
beginning of the Great Recession when a sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar took place. The
pattern of the U.S. dollar exchange rate would be better to explain if we include the crisis period
and its aftermath. Following Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur & McDermott (2016), and Hood &
Malik (2013), I use a large set of potential safe haven instruments and incorporated gold into my
analysis to be able to judge the ultimate safe haven preference of world investors. My research
differs from the current literature by also considering the VSTOXX futures as a potential safe
haven instrument.12
Data & Model
My research uses quarterly data from January 2007 to December 2016. To construct my
sample, I follow Fratzscher (2009) and consider all OECD countries along with some emerging
market countries13 as candidates. The nineteen members of the Eurozone are included as a single
entity, namely the Euro area. I exclude countries that maintain a hard peg exchange rate system,
specifically exchange arrangements with no separate legal tender and currency boards according
to the IMF’s (2017) de facto exchange rate classification.14 The final sample, therefore, covers

12

Hood & Malik (2013) is the only empirical study which evaluates the VIX futures as an investment vehicle. I
explain their main results in detail on Page 25.
13
The emerging market countries that I consider for inclusion are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czechia, Egypt, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad &
Tobago, Turkey. I excluded China, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guyana, Jamaica, Paraguay, Qatar, Senegal, and Trinidad &
Tobago, Turkey because the required data is unavailable.
14
Following the previous literature, I include countries that have soft peg and floating exchange rate regimes. The
IMF (2017) classifies that conventional pegs and exchange rate stabilized arrangements are some soft peg examples.
The most common form of exchange rate stabilized arrangement is anchor currency. For instance, Czechia uses the
U.S. dollar (USD) and Singapore anchors its exchange rate to a currency composite. IMF (2017) states that an
exchange rate which uses stabilized arrangement could change within a margin of two-percent for at least six
months or more. A two-percent window might be beneficial to explain safe haven behavior on the USD.
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33 exchange rates, which are ultimately selected based on data availability. The complete list of
countries used in this paper is presented in the Appendix under Table 1.
The quarterly data starts in the first quarter of 2007, because February 27, 2007 is
recognized as the beginning of the financial crisis (The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
2017). My sample period allows us to focus on exchange rate changes at the start, during and in
the aftermath of the Great Recession.15 My research estimates the recession and the postrecession period using different empirical models. The recession period is defined as January
2007 to March 201116, and the post-recession period runs from April 2011 to December 2016
(The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2017).
My objective is to understand USD behavior related to a rising uncertainty and the crisis
situation. My main hypothesis is that the U.S. dollar reflects significant safe haven behavior. To
empirically investigate bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rates and safe haven behavior, the baseline
empirical model is formulated as
si,t = β0 + β1 (si,t-1) + β2 (VIXt) + β3 (VSTOXXt) + β4 (iust - iothert) + β5 (Zi,t) + αi + ui,t …(1)
where least-square estimation is biased and inconsistent, because αi and si,t-1 are not
independent.17 The first-difference benchmark model is
∆si,t = β0 + β1 (∆si,t-1) + β2 (∆VIXt) + β3 (∆VSTOXXt) + β4 ∆(iust - iothert) + β5 (∆Zi,t-1) +
∆ϵi,t

… (2)
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On 2/27/2007, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) declared that it would not buy the
riskiest subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities henceforth. This announcement prompted panic
behavior toward such assets, which eventually caused a series of bankruptcies, as well as the subsequent
catastrophic and well-known events that marked the Great Recession (Batini & Dowling, 2011).
16
I reran all regressions without the first quarter of 2007. The results did not change.
17
The least-squares estimation fails due to E(αi | si,t-1) ≠ 0.
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where ∆si,t is the first-difference in the log of nominal bilateral exchange rate that is defined as
foreign currency price of the USD. The notation, ∆VIXt, indicates the first-difference in the log
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index whereas ∆VSTOXXt shows the firstdifference in the log of the EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index. ∆(iust - iothert) denotes the shortterm interest rate differential, ∆Zi,t is a vector of country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals,
and ϵi,t is the error term. All the model variables are first-difference in their logs while short-term
interest rate differentials and the current account balance are first-differenced in levels.18
Following the literature, the lagged dependent variable is included in the model
specification, and the above equation (2) is estimated as a dynamic panel model. Since the
lagged dependent variable is not strictly exogeneous, we need an instrumental variable (IV) for
it. There are three main methodologies to deal with endogeneity: Anderson & Hsiao (1981),
Arellano & Bond (1991), and Kiviet (1995). Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) estimation technique is
the oldest one, and it uses the method of moment (MOM) conditions with the IV solution.
Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) methodology limits researchers to using only as many IVs as the
number of endogenous covariates. Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) approach permits the twice
lagged dependent variable (sit-2) or twice lagged differences of the dependent variable (∆sit-2) as
valid instruments for the lagged difference of the dependent variable (∆sit-1). The coefficient
estimate of Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) is inefficient, since their estimation technique does not

18

The current account balance of some economies in my data set indicates negative values in their datasets, and thus
it was not possible to find their logarithmic values. Short-term interest differentials between countries is firstdifferenced in levels, because they are already rates.
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utilize all the available moment conditions.19 Anderson & Hsiao (1981) does not take into
consider the autocorrelation in first differences of errors.
On the other hand, Arellano & Bond (1991) argue that their GMM estimation is more
efficient than Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) methodology by incorporating the GMM technique to
similar panel datasets with small T (time dimension) and large N (individual/country dimension).
Arellano & Bond’s (1991) methodology allows researchers to use all lagged dependent variables
and exogenous covariates as IVs in addition to the exogenous covariates used in Anderson &
Hsiao’s (1981) estimation technique. The GMM estimation technique of Arellano & Bond
(1991) provides consistent and efficient coefficient estimates as it exploits all of the information
available in a sample. Kiviet (1995) also studies estimation of dynamic panel data and argues
that the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation produces very efficient estimation
results when researches remove the bias from the LSDV estimator.
Judson & Owen (1999) investigate the best methodology to estimate a dynamic panel
model for different macroeconomic datasets and develop a way to choose from these three
possibilities. Judson & Owen (1999) discuss that Kiviet’s (1995) LSDV is best if used on data
sets of small T and large N.20 In contrast, Judson & Owen (1999) suggest that the least squares
dummy variable estimation bias remains even if the time dimension equals thirty. Judson &
Owen (1999) determine that all estimation techniques yield better results with a larger N and T
(by using a root mean square error criterion).21 For this reason, I construct a large country sample
If I apply Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) methodology, I could only use 2 instrumental variables because my main
estimation model has 2 endogenous covariates. When I implement Arellano & Bond’s (1991) estimation technique, I
could employ 128 instrumental variables.
20
Judson & Owen (1999) maintain that microeconomic panel datasets have “far smaller T and far greater N than the
typical macroeconomic panel” (p. 9). Therefore, researchers might need different estimation techniques when
studying macroeconomic panel datasets.
21
Judson & Owen (1999) find “for a sufficiently large N and T, the differences in efficiency, bias, and RMSEs of
the different techniques become quite small.” (p. 13).
19

17

to include as many countries as possible. Judson & Owen (1999) find that the least squares
dummy variable estimation only works similarly to other estimation alternatives when T equals
thirty, and does not perform better than others when T is smaller than thirty. Arellano & Bond’s
(1991) methodology (the GMM technique) is the best estimation technique when T equals
twenty, because it generates the lowest root mean square error.22
In my paper, the spot exchange rate of a given country is defined as the period average
national currency per USD, which is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database. The variable “s” is defined as national currency/USD rate. Accordingly, an
increase in the dependent variable indicates an appreciation of the USD, while a decline reflects
a depreciation of the USD.
The VIX is used as an indicator of stock market volatility to assess the impact of market
uncertainty (US sourced) on the behavior of the U.S. dollar. World investors believe that putting
their money into currencies such as the U.S. dollar is ideal when uncertainty rises, as Kaul &
Sapp (2006) argue. The VIX measures volatility in percentage points and is calculated as 100
times the expected 30-day variance of the S&P 500 rate of return. The expected 30-day variance
is a weighted average of the forward prices of two options strips with the two closest nearby
expirations.23 These two option strips are used to calculate the VIX and contain out-of-themoney S&P puts and calls that are immediately below and immediately above the exercise price
of the S&P 500 (CBOE, 2017). My study measures U.S. market uncertainty with this index, and
the volatility of stock markets is a closely watched indicator for everyone who wants to assess
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The recession period has 16 quarters whereas the post-recession era includes 23 quarters to estimate equation (2).
Option strip is a trading strategy that is achieved by purchasing two at-the-money (ATM) puts and one ATM call
of the same underlying stock, strike price and expiration date.
23
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market uncertainty (Habib & Stracca, 2012; Fatum & Yamamoto, 2016). The data for the VIX is
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The VSTOXX measures volatility in percentage points by calculating the 30-day implied
variance, like the VIX, and is often called the European equivalent of the VIX (Rhoads, 2017).
These two indices could contain different information. As Vause & von Peter (2011) state, there
was still high pressure on the Euro-area sovereign bond yields due to weak European economic
performance and policy uncertainty while the US was getting out of the last crisis throughout
2011. Figure 1, in the Appendix, reveals that the VIX and VSTOXX move differently from time
to time. The VSTOXX/VIX spread indicates differences in the information sets of these
volatility indices.
Shore (2017) maintains that investors can use the difference between the VSTOXX and
the VIX as an indicator that shows how these volatility indices move in the near future.
Therefore, market participants might buy VSTOXX futures and sell VIX futures when this
spread is too high (Shore, 2017).24 However, investment strategies about these volatility indices
are beyond the topic of my research, rather I incorporate the VIX and VSTOXX futures as other
safe haven assets in the investors’ choice set toward the end of this chapter.
My article attempts to explain the sharp appreciation of the U.S. dollar at the beginning
of the Great Recession, then strong reversal of the appreciation almost a year later, and after that
phase of appreciation again. Hence, I include all potential variables, which could shed some light
on these interesting exchange rate movements in this sample period.

24

Futures are financial contracts giving both trading parties an obligation to exchange an asset at a predetermined
date and price. VIX and VSTOXX futures provide investors a diversification opportunity to hedge their portfolio
volatility risk by implementing volatility trading strategies.
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Short-term interest rate differentials between countries are added to all of my estimations,
because they are the channel for the effect of carry trade flows. Carry trade is an interest
arbitrage opportunity where an investor borrows in the low interest rate currency (funding
currency) and lends in the high interest rate currency (target currency). Gyntelberg & Remolona
(2007) argue that carry trade is likely to take place if the short-term interest rate differential is
sufficiently large to compensate for foreign exchange rate risk. OECD (2017) states that shortterm interest rates are based on three-month money market rates, or equivalently are the rates of
the government treasury bill of a country. The data of short-term interest rate differentials are
sourced from the OECD’s database and the IMF’s IFS database.25
Fratzscher (2009) suggests that the last crisis underlines the importance of strong
macroeconomic fundamentals of the countries. Similarly, De Bock & Carvalho Filho (2015)
maintain that while the increased frequency of spikes in the VIX demonstrates that global factors
have become more important, country-specific factors continue to be essential in identifying the
impact of those global factors on specific currencies.
Considering the above, there are some country-specific macroeconomic fundamentals
that we need to incorporate as control variables into the empirical model (equation 2). These
macroeconomic fundamentals are foreign exchange (FX) reserves, inflation rate (CPI), exports to
the United States (EXP), imports from the United States (IMP), GDP growth (GDPG), and CA
net balance (CA).26

25

The short-term interest rates of Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Romania, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Serbia, Singapore,
and Thailand are downloaded from the IMF’s IFS database as money market rates. The rest of sample economies’
short-term interest rate data are downloaded from the OECD’s database as short-term interest rates.
26
FX, EXP, IMP are in U.S. dollars. CA of some economies have negative values, and thus is first-differenced in
levels. Short-term interest differentials between countries is first-differenced in levels, because they are already
rates. I do not need to take logs of short-term interest differentials since change in natural logs corresponds to
percentage change. All the remaining model variables are first-differenced in logs.
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FX reserves represent the foreign currency denominated assets that are readily available
and controlled by the central bank of the particular country. These external assets include the
U.S. dollar value of monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), reserve position in the IMF
(the IMF, 2013). FX reserves are obtained from the IMF’s International Reserves and Foreign
Currency Liquidity database as foreign currency reserves (in convertible foreign currency).27
GDP growth is a measure for output and indicates the economic performance of the particular
country. GDP growth data are found in the OECD database.28 In addition, log difference in CPI
shows the inflation rate, and the data for CPI is sourced from the IMF’s IFS database.29
Exports and imports used in my article indicate the value of goods exported to and
imported from the given country into the United States. The main focus of my study is to explain
bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate behavior. For this reason, I only include exports to the U.S.
and imports from the U.S. in my data sample.30 EXP and IMP data are found in the IMF’s
Direction of Trade Statistics webpage. The current account balance measures the net acquisition
of foreign assets so that the country is a net borrower when CA is negative. CA data are acquired
from the IMF’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics webpage.31
Table 2, in the Appendix, provides descriptive statistics for the variables that are included in this
study.

FX data for India and Serbia are found in the IMF’s IFS database as official reserve assets (including gold
deposits), because these countries do not have data in the IMF’s International Reserves and Foreign Currency
Liquidity database.
28
Romania’s GDP growth data are downloaded from the Romania National Institute of Statistic’s webpage:
http://www.insse.ro/cms/en/content/gross-domestic-product.
29
Argentina's CPI is downloaded from Moody's database as CPI (2015=100):
https://www.economy.com/argentina/consumer-price-index-cpi.
30
Those export and import values are free-on-board (FOB) in the U.S. dollar.
31
I executed the R studio’s interface to X-13-ARIMA-SEATS software package of the U.S. Census Bureau to
obtain final seasonally adjusted series.
27
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Results
Benchmark Results
In this section, I estimate the benchmark equation (2) that I introduced earlier. The proper
specification of this model requires that there be no autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.
Arellano & Bond’s (1991) test for the serial correlation structure in the errors demonstrates that
we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of order one and fail to reject no
autocorrelation of order two. This means that the specified model is appropriate, and the
instruments are valid for dynamic panel model regressions, because E (ϵi,t ϵi,t-1) does not need to
be zero as the ϵi,t are first differences of serially uncorrelated errors. The GMM estimation
procedure relies on the assumption that E (ϵi,t ϵi,t-2) = 0, namely the errors are not serially
correlated of order two (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Results of auto-correlation tests are under
Table 4 in the Appendix.
Table 3, in the Appendix, presents benchmark results of this study.32 The coefficient on
the VIX is positive and significant for both the crisis and the post-crisis period. The positive
coefficient on the VIX mean that the USD appreciates when U.S. market uncertainty rises. In
other words, the depreciation of non-US currencies against the U.S. dollar are certainly
influenced by safe haven behavior. This finding is striking since the US was at the epicenter of
the last financial crisis. Consequently, the positive effect of U.S. market uncertainty on the
change of the USD exchange rate suggests flight-to-safety phenomenon of foreign investors, and

32

The recession model incorporates the second and third lagged dependent variables, while the post-recession model
includes the second lagged dependent variable as additional regressors. Models that have only the first lagged
dependent variable fail to reject no auto-correlation of order two.
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repatriation of capital flows to the United States by the U.S. investors during and after the Great
Recession.
On the other hand, the coefficient on the VSTOXX is insignificant in the Great Recession
and its aftermath. The insignificant coefficient on the VSTOXX implies that the European stock
market volatility does not affect the value of the USD. This result is important because, the Euroarea sovereign debt crisis kept uncertainty high while the US was trying to get back to normal
terms.
The significant and positive impact of the VIX on the USD supports McCauley &
McGuire (2009)’s claims. McCauley & McGuire (2009) argue that the recent financial crisis
generated a safe haven demand for the U.S. Treasury bills (considered safe asset), because the
U.S. investors and foreign investors wished to decrease risk in their portfolios. For that reason,
foreign investors began to get rid of the U.S. corporate bonds while the U.S. investors started to
sell foreign bonds and stocks, thus everyone went towards the U.S. T-bills and T-bonds.
The coefficient on non-US economies’ inflation rate is positive and significant for the
crisis and post-crisis periods. The positive and significant relationship between the inflation rate
and the USD emphasizes the importance of price stability. Therefore, this result suggests that
stable exchange rates and price stability cannot be achieved separately.
There is a negative and significant relationship between the change in the spot bilateral
exchange rate of the USD and the foreign currency denominated reserves (FX) of non-US
countries at time of the Great Recession. The negative and significant coefficient on FX indeed
implies that if a country has a high level of foreign reserves, it is more likely to protect its
currency from huge depreciations against the USD. The negative and significant effect of FX on
23

the value of USD is an expected result, which is consistent with the findings of Fratzscher
(2009). As Fratzscher (2009) maintains, extreme amounts of FX reserves could be helpful in
reducing the pressure on the country’s currencies, since positive FX growth rate is significantly
related to the appreciation of the currency vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar.33
My research further shows that GDP growth and the CA of non-US economies play
important roles on the behavior of the USD at the time of the Great Recession. The positive and
significant impact of non-US GDP growth indicates that better economic performance of a
country is related to the depreciation of its currency against the USD during the Great Recession.
On the other hand, non-US CA significantly appreciates the U.S. dollar in the recession era.
These findings amplify the demand of the USD during the Great Recession so that CA surplus
and positive economic growth could not prevent depreciations of non-US currencies against the
USD.
The coefficient on imports from the US (IMP) is negative and significant in the crisis era
and becomes insignificant in the post-crisis period. To the best of my knowledge, my article is
the only study that links the bilateral trade relationship to the USD in the Great Recession. The
insignificant trade effect on the USD might be due to the fact that the majority of the current safe
haven literature uses total trade balance of countries thereby potentially having the two variables
offset each other.34

33

Fratzscher (2009) defines extreme FX reserves that exceed what is needed for an economy.
Fratzscher (2009) incorporates exports to the US and imports from the US into his model, but obtains insignificant
results on the coefficients of these trade variables. Following his article, my paper employs the value of exports to
the US, and the value of imports from the US. Kohler (2010) reports that short-term interest rate differentials have
more explanatory power on crisis-related exchange rate changes in the Great Recession than in the past. Kohler
(2010) does not test whether the relationship between the short-term interest rate differential and exchange rate
movements changed with the last financial crisis. To see whether a structural change takes place at the time of the
Great Recession’s onset, I estimate a structural break model using an F-test (Chow, 1960) following the Hausmantest for fixed-effects vs. random-effects (Hausman, 1978). The results of the random-effect-model show that the
34
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The coefficient on the short-term interest rate differential (iust - iothert) is insignificant for
the crisis period. In addition to the crisis period, carry trade flows do not affect the value of the
USD significantly after the last financial crisis as well. I could argue that unwinding carry trade
activities do not appear for the crisis period only, because world investors had continued to have
some concerns to engage in risky arbitrage opportunities after the Great Recession.35
Investors’ Choice as Safe Haven
After finding the evidence that the USD serves as a safe haven during the Great
Recession and its aftermath, the next step is to consider safe haven instruments (that can be
bought and sold in the USD) from the investors’ standpoint. To determine safe haven choice of
world investors, the relationship between potential safe haven instruments and the U.S. stock
market needs to be analyzed. These safe haven instruments include precious metals (such as gold
and silver), and U.S. government treasury bills, notes, and bills. The VIX and VSTOXX futures
are also other safe haven alternatives since the purpose of these volatility indices is to make
volatility tradable (STOXX, 2018; Whaley, 2009).
There is a related safe haven literature that investigates the safe haven status of gold
relative to other precious metals and the VIX futures. Baur & Lucey (2010) and Baur &
McDermott (2010) are the first studies to define and confirm safe haven and hedge status of gold
against the stock market. Baur & Lucey (2010) use daily data from the end of November 1995 to
November 30, 2005 and Baur & McDermott (2010) cover from March 2, 1979 to March 2, 2009.

relationship between the short-term interest rate differentials and bilateral USD exchange rate does not change
significantly after the existence of the last financial crisis. This structural break analysis demonstrate that there is a
break-point in the series of my sample variables with the start of the Great Recession (first quarter of 2007). I
present the findings of structural break regression under Table 1.5 in the Appendix. The results seem robust if I
employ a fixed-effect-model.
35

The coefficient on exports to the US (EXP) is also not significant in both of the recession and post-recession era.
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Hood & Malik (2013) ask a similar research question to the one posed by Baur & McDermott
(2010) and extend Baur & Lucey’s (2010) sample data from 2005 to 2010. Hood & Malik (2013)
maintain that gold is an important safe haven for the European and U.S. stock markets. Hood &
Malik (2013) conclude that the VIX futures is safe haven while gold is a hedge against the U.S.
stock market. Furthermore, Baur & McDermott (2016) analyze potential safe haven assets by
employing daily data from January 1970 to the end of 2013. Baur & McDermott (2016) state that
gold, the three-month U.S. T-bill, and the ten-year U.S. T-bond are safe havens if the S&P 500
performs worse than the one percent quantile of the stock return distribution.
Following Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur & McDermott (2016), and Hood & Malik (2013),
my research defines hedge and safe haven assets as follows: A safe haven asset is described as an
asset that is negatively correlated with stock returns at the time of extreme stock market declines.
By the same token, an asset is identified as a hedge if it is negatively correlated with the stock
market return on average.36
To perform comparable analysis to this literature, I employ the following regression
∆asseti,t = β0 + β1(∆S&Pt) + β2(∆Zt) + δ1* Dq10 (∆S&Pt) + δ2* Dq5 (∆S&Pt) + δ3* Dq1
(∆S&Pt) + ϵt ..... (3)
where asseti,t represents the return of potential safe haven asset, ∆S&Pt indicates the U.S. stock
market return, ∆Zt is the vector of other potential safe haven assets’ return. Following the
literature, I multiply ∆S&Pt with dummies which denote extreme negative downturns by

36

Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur & McDermott (2016), and Hood & Malik (2013) consider their asset definitions as
weak and strong alternatives. An asset is classified as a weak safe haven if its return is not affected by the stock
returns during extreme stock market downturns. I do not mention about the weak safe haven and hedge potential of
these assets and limit myself to strong ones, because I try to find assets that are negatively correlated with the stock
market return.
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calculating the first, five, and ten-percentage-quantiles of the S&P 500 Index’s return. For
instance, Dq5 equals 1 if the U.S. stock market return is less than the five-percentage-quantile of
the return distribution of the S&P 500.
The potential safe haven assets considered in this study are gold and silver as precious
metals; VIX and VSTOXX futures; three-month and one-year U.S.37 T-Bill; three-year, fiveyear, and ten-year U.S. T-Note; and twenty-year U.S. T-Bond. All Treasury bill, note, and bonds
are the first-difference in levels.38 VIX, VSTOXX, gold and silver futures’ prices are firstdifferenced in logarithmic forms. As a consequence, significant and negative β1 implies that the
asset is a hedge, whereas an asset is safe haven if one or more deltas become negative and
significant.39
I employ monthly data from March 2003 to December 2016 to estimate the above
regression (3). Table 6, in the Appendix, presents the results of investors’ safe haven choices,
and denotes that gold does not qualify as a safe haven, but instead becomes a hedge. The
VSTOXX futures is a safe haven choice if the U.S. stock market return shows extreme negative
returns less than the first-percentage-quantile of its return distribution. The VSTOXX futures are
qualified as a hedge against the S&P 500 Index. On the contrary, the VIX futures are only a
hedge against the U.S. stock market on average. The one-year T-bill, five-year T-Note and
twenty-year T-Bond are other safe haven possibilities for investors if the S&P 500 Index

VIX and VSTOXX futures offer investors to be able to trade pure volatility by showing the stock market’s future
estimated values of these volatility indices.
38
I apply Breusch & Pagan’s (1979) heteroskedasticity test and estimate the above regression with robust standard
errors if heteroskedasticity is present. I present heteroscedasticity test results under Table 7 in the Appendix. I find
that I reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for gold and silver. I show that there is homoskedasticity of all
error variances for the VIX and VSTOXX futures; 3-month and 1-year T-Bill; 3-year, 5-year, and 10-year T-Note;
20-year T-Bond.
39
Gold price data is acquired from World Gold Council’s webpage: https://www.gold.org/data/gold-price.
Silver price data is found at the Investing.com’s webpage: https://www.investing.com/commodities/silver.
The data for U.S. government treasuries is sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
37

27

performs lower return than the first-percentage-quantile of its return distribution. The 3-months
T-bill is considered as another safe haven if the U.S. stock market return is lower than the fivepercentage quantile of the return distribution of S&P 500 Index. Additionally, the twenty-year TBond is also a hedge against the U.S. stock market.
Conclusion
The Great Recession led to unexpected exchange rate fluctuations with the sharp
appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and a reversal of that appreciation within a year. My research
demonstrates that safe haven behavior is the most consistent and significant explanatory
indicator for the USD before, during and after the Great Recession. The findings of my article
are consistent with flight-to-safety behavior of world investors, because the U.S. stock market
uncertainty has a significant and consistent role on the appreciation of the U.S. dollar (USD)
since the start of the Great Recession. Furthermore, the Euro-area stock market uncertainty has
no significant impact on the value of the USD although the Euro-area sovereign debt crisis was
still the major source of uncertainty when the U.S. economy started to recover from the Great
Recession. This result amplifies the safe haven currency status of the USD and denotes that the
United States offers the best possible solution even though problems are U.S. sourced.
To determine the investors’ ultimate choice safe haven asset (spanning the period from
March 2003 to the end of 2016), I examined the potential safe haven role of gold, silver, the US
T-bill, T-note, and T-bond at different times to maturity. As a consequence, the 1-year T-bill, the
5-year T-note, the 20-year T-bond are considered to be as the strongest safe haven instruments
when the S&P 500 Index’s return is below than the first-percentage-quantile of its return
distribution. In addition, world investors considered the 3-months T-bill as yet another safe

28

haven asset when the U.S stock market performs lower than the five-percentage-quantile of the
S&P 500 Index return distribution.
Yet, foreign assets of the non-US economies that are proxied by the growth in their
foreign currency denominated exchange reserves is also an important shelter from the huge
depreciations of a country’s currency vis-à-vis USD during the Great Recession. Having implied
the interconnection between the price and exchange rate stability, my article further shows that
increases in the inflation rate significantly appreciate the USD.
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Appendix A. The VIX Calculation
The VIX calculation is as follows:
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where
σ is VIX/100 so that VIX = σ × 100,
T is the time to expiration and calculated as minutes remaining S&P 500 Index
expirations divided to total minutes in a year,
F is forward at-the-money price desired from the S&P 500 Index option prices,
K0 is first strike below the forward index level (F), Ki is highest strike price of the
ith out-the-money option from the S&P 500 puts and calls. A call if Ki > K0; and a put if
Ki < K0; both put and call if Ki =K0. ∆Ki =

𝐾𝑖+1 − 𝐾𝑖−1
2

in which ∆K for the lowest

strike is simply the difference between the lowest strike and the next higher strike.
Equivalently, ∆K for the highest strike is the difference between the highest strike and
the next lower strike. Thus, ∆K is half the distance between the two strikes adjacent to K.
R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration (refinancing factor),
Q (Ki) is the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each option with strike Ki.
Notes: Source is CBOE (2015) and CBOE (2017).
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Appendix B. The VSTOXX Calculation
The VSTOXX calculation is as follows:

𝜎𝑖 2 =

2
𝑇

∑𝑗

∆𝐾𝑖,𝑗

2
𝐾𝑖,𝑗

𝑒 𝑅𝑖 𝑇 𝑀𝐾𝑖,𝑗 −

1
𝑇

[

𝐹𝑖
𝐾𝑖,0

− 1]2

where
σ is VSTOXX/100 so that VSTOXX = σ × 100,
T is the time to expiration and equals to calculated as seconds remaining EURO
STOXX 50 Index expirations divided to total seconds in a year,
Fi is forward at-the-money price for the ith EURO STOXX 50 option’s
expiration,
K0 is highest strike price below the forward index level (F), Ki is strike price of
the ith out-the-money option from the S&P 500 puts and calls. A call if Ki > K0; and a
put if Ki < K0; both put and call if Ki =K0. ∆Ki =

𝐾𝑖+1 − 𝐾𝑖−1
2

in which ∆K for the

lowest strike is simply the difference between the lowest strike and the next higher strike.
Equivalently, ∆K for the highest strike is the difference between the highest strike and
the next lower strike. Thus, ∆K is half the distance between the two strikes adjacent to K.
R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration (refinancing factor). 𝑀𝐾𝑖,𝑗 is the
inclusion price with strike Ki whereas 𝑀𝐾𝑖,0 indicates the midpoint of put and call prices
of the option with strike Ki.
Notes: Source is STOXX (2018).
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Appendix C. Plots and Main Results
Figure 1. Plot of the VIX & VSTOXX

Notes: The mean spread of the VSTOXX and the VIX is 2.51 volatility points. This spread is the
subtraction of the VSTOXX from the VIX in logarithmic forms.
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Figure 2. Plot for exchange rate of Canada and Sweden

Notes: The left-axis represents the country’s home currency price per the U.S. dollar (national
currency/USD rate) (st).
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Figure 3. Plot for exchange rate of Indonesia and South Korea

Notes: The left-axis represents the country’s home currency price per the U.S. dollar (national
currency/USD rate) (st).
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Figure 4. Plot for exchange rate of South Africa and Chile

Notes: The left-axis represents the country’s home currency price per the U.S. dollar (national
currency/USD rate) (st).
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Table 1. Country Sample of Essay One
Albania *

Malaysia *

Argentina

Mexico

Australia

New Zealand

Brazil

Norway

Canada

Peru *

Chile

Philippines

Colombia *

Poland

Czechia

Romania *

Denmark

Russia *

the Euro-area

Serbia *

Hungary *

Singapore

Iceland

South Africa

India *

Sweden

Indonesia *

Switzerland

Israel

Thailand

Japan

the United Kingdom

South Korea *

Notes: * countries are excluded from the structural break analysis due to data availability before
2007.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Essay One

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

USD exchange rate

1.284

1.113

-0.031

4.141

CBOE’s Volatility Index

1.292

0.149

1.097

1.753

EURO STOXX Volatility Index

1.388

0.122

1.204

1.75

Interest rate differentials

-3.557

4.175

-34.877

4.932

CA Balance

2,126,944

15,543,349

-45,909,406

112,903,615

Foreign exchange reserves

4.525

1.08

-3.087

6.087

Inflation Rate

0.004

0.005

-0.014

0.059

Exports to the US

3.327

0.905

0.021

4.988

Imports from the US

3.233

0.835

0.766

4.899

GDP Growth

0.738

1.246

-7.55

8.828

Notes: All my model variables are in logs except short-term interest rate differentials and current
account balance of sample economies. Foreign exchange reserves and current account balance
are in thousands of U.S. dollars.
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Table 3. Benchmark Results of the Essay One’s Dynamic Panel Model
Recession Results

(January 2007 – March 2011)

Post-Recession Results

(April 2011 – December 2016)

1st Lagged dependent variable 0.607

(<0.001) *

1st Lagged dependent variable

0.937

(<0.001) *

2nd Lagged dependent variable -0.346

(<0.001) *

2nd Lagged dependent variable

-0.222

(<0.001) *

3rd Lagged dependent variable 0.13

(0.002) *

3rd Lagged dependent variable

N/A

VIX

0.096

(0.004) *

VIX

0.096

(<0.001) *

VSTOXX

0.52

(0.154)

VSTOXX

-0.007

(0.648)

FX

-0.065

(0.044) *

FX

-0.026

(0.481)

Interest rate differentials

0.001

(0.998)

Interest rate differentials

0.002

(0.136)

CPI

0.806

(<0.001) *

CPI

0.608

(0.001) *

GDPG

0.002

(0.021) *

GDPG

0.001

(0.093)

EXP

-0.003

(0.912)

EXP

-0.033

(0.056)

IMP

-0.063

(0.005) *

IMP

-0.004

(0.73)

CA

0.001

(0.028) *

CA

0.001

(0.55)

Constant

-0.577

(0.061) *

Constant

-0.741

(0.042) *

Notes: The table shows the coefficient estimates and the p-values in the parenthesis. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 4. Auto-correlation Test Results for Benchmark Model of Essay One (Equation 2)
Autocorrelation Test Order

p-value for the recession era

p-value for the post-recession era

Test Order 1

<0.001

0.001

Test Order 2

0.755

0.152

Test Order 3

0.968

0.153

Test Order 4

0.194

0.312

Notes: Due to the inclusion of the second and third lagged dependent variables, we have to test
the hypothesis of no auto-correlation of order 3 and 4 (addition to order 2)
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Table 5. Results for the Structural Break Analysis
Variable

Coefficient Estimate (p-value)

VIX

0.01

(0.424)

FX

-0.057 *

(<0.001)

Interest Rate Differentials

-0.001

CPI

1.417 *

(<0.001)

GDPG

-0.003 *

(<0.001)

EXP

-0.054 *

(<0.001)

IMP

-0.034 *

(<0.001)

CA

0.001

(0.111)

Break Dummy

0.003 *

(0.005)

Break Dummy*VIX

0.087 *

(<0.001)

Break Dummy*Interest Rate Differentials

-0.001

(0.972)

Constant

-0.741 *

(0.005)

(0.542)

F-test for Break Dummies: H0 : δ1 = δ2 = δ3 = 0
H1 :at least one of them not zero
Results for F-test: F(3, 58) = 13.11 (Fcritical = 2.79)

p-value = <0.001

Notes: This table presents the results of the regression of model variables and structural break
dummies on bilateral USD exchange rate return (national currency/USD rate). I define structural
break dummies as taking value of one after the Great Recession (zero otherwise). * indicates
statistical significance at the 5% level. Economies included in this model are Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, the Euro area, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Thailand and the UK.
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Table 6. Results for the Investors’ Choice as Safe Haven Analysis of Essay One (Equation 3)
Variable

Hedge

Safe haven at the Safe haven at the Safe haven at the
1% quantile
5% quantile
10% quantile

Potential Safe
Haven Asset

S&P 500
Coefficient
Estimate
(p-value) – β1

Stock Return *
Dummy
Quantile at the
1% - δ1

Stock Return *
Dummy
Quantile at the
5% - δ2

Stock Return *
Dummy
Quantile at the
10% - δ3

-0.025
(0.06)
0.029
(0.239)
-0.03
(0.533)
-0.135 *
(0.01)
0.18 *
(0.012)
-0.098*
(0.04)
0.018
(0.524)
-0.04 *
(0.032)
0.06 **
(<0.001)
-0.084*
(0.005)

-0.001
(0.903)
-0.002
(0.886)
-0.03
(0.262)
0.002
(0.945)
-0.099 *
(0.018)
0.052
(0.06)
0.007
(0.66)
-0.005
(0.593)
0.006
(0.562)
-0.013
(0.461)

0.011
(0.07)
-0.008
(0.514)
0.015
(0.525)
-0.033
(0.204)
0.031
(0.374)
-0.02
(0.399)
-0.013
(0.35)
0.009
(0.341)
-0.005
(0.519)
0.004
(0.790)

Gold

-0.003
(0.981)
Silver
0.264
(0.256)
VIX Futures
-1.515 *
(<0.001)
VSTOXX Futures -2.749 *
(0.004)
3-months T-Bill
-0.035
(0.959)
1-year T-Bill
0.301
(0.505)
3-year T-Note
-0.16
(0.547)
5-year T-Note
-0.121
(0.503)
10-year T-Note
0.384 *
(0.02)
20-year T-Bond
-0.79 *
(0.006)

Notes: This table shows the results for regression of particular potential safe haven assets on the
return on S&P 500 Index, safe haven dummies, and other potential safe haven assets. These safe
haven dummies represent extreme negative stock market returns less than 1,5, and 10-percentquantile of the S&P 500 Index’s return distribution. ** denotes that the safe haven instrument is
a diversifier asset.

48

Table 7. Breusch & Pagan’s (1979) Heteroskedasticity Test Results of Essay One (Equation 3)
Dependent Variable – Potential Safe Haven

p-value for the Heteroskedasticity Test

Asset (∆asseti,t)
Gold

0.25

Silver

0.281

VIX Futures

0.003

VSTOXX Futures

0.05

3-Month Bond

0.002

1-Year Bond

0.021

3-Year Bond

0.007

5-Year Bond

0.008

10-Year Bond

0.001

20-Year Bond

0.02

Test Hypothesis: H0 : The error variances are all equal (homoscedasticity)
H1 : The error variances are not equal (heteroscedasticity)
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CHAPTER III
IS THE EURO A SAFE HAVEN CURRENCY?
This research analyzes euro exchange movements against thirty-three currencies during
and after the Great Recession. In particular, I study the performance of the euro regarding its
potential safe haven status against thirty-three currencies at the time of the last financial crisis
and its aftermath.40 In the spirit of Kaul & Sapp (2006) and Habib & Stracca (2012), my paper
describes the euro as a safe haven currency when it serves as a hedge with respect to market
uncertainty. World investors seek to buy potential safe haven assets because their attractiveness
relative to other assets increases while market uncertainty climbs (Kohler, 2010). My study
reveals that the euro qualifies as a safe haven currency after the Great Recession, when
uncertainty originates in the United States (and is not sourced from the Euro area). However, if
uncertainty originates in the Euro area, global investors do not opt for the euro as a safe haven.
The EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) and the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) are market uncertainty variables for my study. The VSTOXX
reveals market expectations of future fluctuations in the European stock market because this
index is constructed as a futures instrument for the Euro-area stock market volatility (STOXX,
2018; Whaley, 2009).41 The Stoxx Strategy Index Guide (Stoxx, 2018) states, “This is not
achieved through direct replication of volatility, but rather of variance” (p.26). The VSTOXX

40

These are the currencies of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechia, Denmark,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the UK, and
the US.
41
Whaley (1993) examines the purpose and history of the VIX and states that the volatility index level equals the
volatility futures price.
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reflects the implied volatility 42 of the EURO STOXX 50 Index by replicating the variance of all
eligible EURO STOXX 50 options over a future time horizon (Stoxx, 2018).43
Following Habib & Stracca (2012) and Fatum & Yamamoto (2016), I also use the VIX as
an indicator of market uncertainty. The current literature (e.g. Fratzscher 2009; Habib & Stracca
2012; Fatum & Yamamoto 2016) only incorporate the VIX in their models. However, the
researcher needs to incorporate the VSTOXX and VIX in the same model to more completely
assess whether the euro is a safe haven currency. The Chicago Board Options (CBOE) (2015)
states that the VIX calculates the implied volatility of the S&P 500 Index. The VIX and
VSTOXX are calculated in comparable ways, one simply referring to the U.S. stock market and
the other referring to the European stock market.44 Nevertheless, the VIX and VSTOXX might
contain different information, because these volatility indicators are not reflective of the same
markets. This is borne out by the plots of the two indexes over the same period in Figure 5 (in
the Appendix). Figure 5 suggests the existence of different information sets using the
VSTOXX/VIX spread, which is computed by subtracting the VSTOXX from the VIX in logs.
The mean spread of the VIX and VSTOXX is 2.51 volatility points. Figure 5 further
demonstrates different sources of market uncertainty as the VSTOXX/VIX spread seems to
reflect. Different information contained in these volatility indices, in turn, may be useful to
explain exchange rate behavior.

42

Implied volatility denotes expected volatility return in a stock that is obtained from an option-pricing model by
using time to expiration, the difference between actual price and strike price of a stock, and a risk-free interest rate.
Implied volatility is an important indicator by which global investors could forecast future fluctuations of the price
of a security.
43
The S&P 500 and EURO STOXX 50 indices show the performance of the largest corporations in terms of freefloat market capitalization. The S&P 500 Index includes stocks of 500 companies, whereas the EURO STOXX 50
Index contains the largest 50 companies in 11 original members of the Euro-area. These countries are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Both of these
volatility indices use free-float market cap methodology in which large corporations get higher weighting.
44
I further explore the detailed calculation of these volatility indices in the Appendix (Appendix A & B).
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Hence, the VIX and VSTOXX, as volatility indices, are crucial variables embodied in the
main hypotheses of interest for my research, since researchers might utilize them to identify safe
haven behavior. The VIX and VSTOXX provide us with the ability to detect safe haven flows by
allowing how the exchange rates respond to these indicators of future volatility. For instance, if
an increase in the VSTOXX (or in the VIX) is associated with an appreciation of the euro, then
this implies that the euro is a safe haven currency.
To counter the dominant power of United States and become a world economic
contender, countries in Europe strove to come together and produce a common currency that
could compete with the U.S. dollar (Krugman et al., 2012). In 1999, this currency was born—the
Euro.45 Does the euro behave like the U.S. dollar in terms of offering a safe haven option? In the
first essay of this dissertation, I studied the U.S. dollar and found that global investors choose the
U.S. dollar as a safe haven currency even though volatility from the Great Recession originated
in the US. The existing literature specifies that the euro, the U.S. dollar, the Japanese yen, the
Great Britain pound, and the Swiss franc are possible safe-haven currency candidates (Fatum et
al., 2017). However, this safe haven literature misses testing the safe haven status of the euro. To
determine whether the euro is a safe haven, I use the Great Recession and European sovereign
debt crisis as important time periods when there was extreme market uncertainty.46 Therefore,
my study tests the safe haven hypothesis for the euro during these highly uncertain time periods.

45

Having specified conditions to join the Euro area (five convergence criteria) in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty
imposed the attainment of stable national nominal exchange rate within the European Monetary System as one of
these convergence criteria. In 1999, the euro was officially in the financial market as the common Euro-area
currency.
46
Vause & von Peter (2011) argue that Euro-area was facing high pressure on the Euro-area sovereign bond yields
with high debt burdens because of weak European economic performance and policy uncertainty. At the same time
throughout 2011, the US was exiting from the Great Recession. The European sovereign debt crisis is another time
episode that gives us an opportunity to test for safe haven flows.
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Literature Review
The existing safe haven literature can be separated into two types of studies. One group
of studies use high-frequency data and the other uses low-frequency data. High-frequency data is
defined as data at shorter than monthly time intervals (such as daily data). Low-frequency data is
defined as data at monthly or longer than monthly time intervals (e.g. quarterly data). Fatum &
Yamamoto (2016), Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015), and Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) are
important examples of studies that use high-frequency data. They use the Chicago Board Options
Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as the major indicator of market uncertainty. The authors using
high-frequency data compare the performance of conventionally assumed safe-haven currencies
against one another to be able to decide which of these currencies serve as a hedge during times
of crisis. If a currency is a safe haven, we would expect to see that its value appreciates vis-à-vis
the others as investors move from assets that are riskier into less risky ones (the safe havens).
These articles explore different threshold values to distinguish periods of high versus low
uncertainty. The purpose of these researchers is to analyze the relationship between the VIX and
the exchange rate (a reflection of safe haven flows into a currency) and in particular whether
those presumed flows hinge upon a specific level of market uncertainty.
Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) analyze safe haven flows between the US, Euro area, the
UK, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, and Sweden before, during, and after the Great Recession.
These authors examine the exchange rate of these economies against the U.S. dollar (USD) and
show that the Swiss franc and yen significantly appreciate vis-à-vis the USD at the time of the
Great Recession. Having endogenously specified market uncertainty thresholds, their non-linear
analysis reveals that the yen appreciates as market uncertainty rises regardless of the VIX
threshold, while the relationship between VIX and other bilateral USD rates seems to be non53

linear. For this reason, Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) conclude that the yen is the best safe haven
currency out of these conventionally-assumed safe havens. Fatum et al. (2017) apply the same
methodology to investigate the relationship between market uncertainty and the relative value of
the Chinese renminbi against the U.S. dollar, the yen, the euro, the pound, and the Swiss franc
from February 28, 2011 to April 30, 2016. Fatum et al. (2017) maintain that the Chinese
renminbi depreciates against the U.S. dollar (USD) as uncertainty rises. This implies that the
Chinese currency is not safer than the USD and the yen, because Fatum et al. (2017) show that
the Chinese renminbi depreciates against the USD and the yen when uncertainty rises. Fatum et
al. (2017) also find that the renminbi appreciates against the euro and the pound while
uncertainty increases. The authors, thus, conclude that the USD and the yen are the safest
currencies and the renminbi comes next. According to Fatum et al.’s (2017) results, the euro and
the pound are the least safe currencies in their dataset.
Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) use the same approach as Fatum & Yamamoto (2016) and
investigate the euro, yen, and pound against the USD from January 1993 to December 2008.
However, this study incorporates more determinants of exchange rates like a carry trade
channel47 and different risk variables.48 The authors argue that the euro, Swiss franc, and yen
appear to have safe haven properties while the pound does not.
Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) investigate which G10 currencies might be evaluated as
safe havens. This article uses the Modern Index Strategy (MSCI) world index as the stock market

47

Carry trade refers to an interest arbitrage opportunity for investors on account of opportunity to borrow in the low
interest rate currency and lend in the high interest rate currency.
48
Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) employ the VIX, the TED spread, and foreign exchange volatility as their risk
variables. The TED spread is the difference between the USD LIBOR rate and the T-bill rate. Foreign exchange
volatility is the first principal component of the realized volatilities of bilateral USD exchange rates in their
logarithmic forms. The authors conclude that foreign exchange volatility and the VIX (for the yen only) are
significant risk variables in their analysis.
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return for the period of January 1986 to September 2012. Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015)
determine market uncertainty thresholds from the old version VIX (the VXO)49 and also employ
carry trade as another regressor as Ranaldo & Soderling (2010) did.50 Hossfeld & MacDonald’s
findings (2015) are that the USD and the Swiss franc are the only currencies to qualify as safe
havens when all of the G10 currencies are considered.
In the literature that studies safe haven behavior and employs low-frequency data, a
monthly or quarterly market uncertainty indicator along with macroeconomic fundamentals are
used to explain safe haven behavior. Fatum et al. (2017) claim that there is no consensus as to
what variables can be used to identify a safe haven currency. Nonetheless, the current safe haven
literature analyzes a wide range of macroeconomic indicators to explain safe haven currency
behavior but mainly investigates whether the USD is a safe haven. Fratzscher (2009), Kohler
(2010), and Habib & Stracca (2012) are important examples in the safe haven literature that uses
low-frequency data.
Fratzscher (2009) analyzes the USD vis-à-vis 54 currencies during 2008 and 2009 in a
cross-sectional regression model. Having measured all model variables prior to the Great
Recession, Fratzscher (2009) demonstrates that the USD significantly appreciates against the
currencies of countries which have higher financial liabilities to the US, larger current account
(CA) deficits, and fewer foreign currency denominated assets.
Habib & Stracca (2012) explore the fundamental determinants of being a safe haven
currency by including the MSCI world stock market index like Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015)

49

The VIX data is available after January 1990, whereas the VXO data starts at January 1986. The VXO is based on
the S&P 100 Index.
50
Carry trade is an arbitrage opportunity in which a global investor borrows in the low interest rate currency
(funding currency) and lends in the high interest rate currency (target currency).
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do. These authors study 51 bilateral exchange rates against the USD from January 1986 to
December 2009. As Hossfeld & MacDonald (2015) point out, a drawback to Habib & Stracca’s
(2012) analysis is dependent on data interpolation methods due to the unavailability of their
model variables at the monthly frequency. Habib & Stracca’s (2012) findings reveal that the net
foreign asset position is the most consistent predictor of safe haven status, due to the positive and
significant coefficient on the bilateral USD exchange rate in periods of high global uncertainty
(in all their model specifications).
Kohler (2010), instead, researches the last major financial crises, namely the Asian crisis,
the Russian debt default, and the Great Recession. This paper presents exchange rate returns of
33 currencies against the Japanese yen during the two-month period after the start of a given
crisis period. Kohler (2010) compares exchange rate correlation to the average short-term
contemporaneous interest rate and the average short-term interest rates in the previous six
months. This article concludes that short-term interest rate differentials have more impact on
exchange rate behavior at the time of the Great Recession than during the other previous three
crises.
There are two important conclusions from the safe haven literature. First, the current
literature concludes that the USD is a safe haven currency regardless of the frequency of the
data. Some of the studies evaluating whether the euro, the yen, and the Swiss franc serve as safe
havens find that these currencies might serve as safe haven currencies. However, the results are
weak for the euro providing motivation for further exploration of the safe haven properties of the
euro. A second conclusion follows from this literature review. The VIX, CA, foreign exchange
reserves, the net foreign asset position (NFA) are the most commonly employed variables used
to test safe haven hypothesis for currencies.
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My research contributes to the safe haven literature in a couple of ways. To the best of
my knowledge, there is no research that has explored the euro safe haven hypothesis during the
Great Recession and its aftermath. The Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis
are both important and alternative sources of uncertainty to judge the safe haven status of the
euro given the greater number of sources of uncertainty. My research further includes the
volatility index for the European stock prices (VSTOXX) as a market uncertainty indicator for
the Euro-area. It serves as an additional source of information. Using the VSTOXX and VIX in
the same model has not been employed to date in the safe haven literature. I also investigate the
ultimate safe haven preference of global investors by using a large set of potential safe haven
instruments including gold. I follow Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur & McDermott (2016), and
Hood & Malik (2013) to determine the safe haven instrument choices of world investors, but I
also incorporate the VSTOXX futures as another potential safe haven instrument.
Data & Model
My research employs quarterly51 and seasonally adjusted52 data from January 2007 to
December 2016. To obtain my sample of countries, I consider including all OECD countries and
some emerging market countries53. I incorporate the nineteen members of the Euro area as a
single entity. I then exclude several countries from the original set of OECD plus emerging
market countries depending on number of criteria. My first criteria for keeping an economy in

51

The current account balance and GDP growth data are available at quarterly basis and not at monthly frequency.
The data I obtain is not seasonally adjusted with the exception of the GDP growth and short-term interest rate
differentials. The data for GDP growth is available as seasonally adjusted at the OECD’s database. I used the R
studio’s interface of X-13-ARIMA-SEATS software package of the U.S. Census Bureau to seasonally adjust the
data requiring seasonal adjustment.
53
The emerging market economies that I consider for inclusion are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Czechia, Egypt, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad &
Tobago, Turkey. I excluded China, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guyana, Jamaica, Paraguay, Qatar, Senegal, and Trinidad &
Tobago, Turkey because the required data is not available.
52
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the sample is determining that it maintains a floating exchange rate regime. I used the IMF’s
(2017) de facto exchange rate classification to ascertain the exchange rate system in place. I
eliminated countries which maintain a hard peg exchange rate, exchange arrangement with no
separate legal tender (e.g. countries that are dollarized) and currency boards. I keep in the sample
economies that have a soft peg exchange rate regime. My final sample contains thirty-three
countries that satisfy the conditions described above and for which data are available. The
complete list of country/country areas in my sample is listed in the Appendix in Table 8.
According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ financial crisis timeline, I classify
the period from January 2007 to the end of March 2011 as the recession period, and from April
2011 to December 2016 as the post-recession period.54 I estimate exchange rate behavior during
the recession and the post-recession periods separately.
To test the hypothesis that the euro is a safe haven, I formulate the baseline empirical
model as
si,t = β0 + β1 (si,t-1) + β2 (VSTOXXt) + β3 (VIXt) + β4 (ieurot - iothert) + β5 (Zi,t) + αi + ui,t …(1)
where αi represents individual (country panel) heterogeneity and si,t-1 is the lagged dependent
variable. This model is inappropriate because αi and si,t-1 are not independent which leads to
biased and inefficient least-squares estimation results.55 I, then, use a first-difference model and
estimate the following first-difference benchmark model as
∆si,t = β0 + β1 (∆si,t-1) + β2 (∆VSTOXXt) + β3 (∆VIXt) + β4 ∆(ieurot - iothert) + β5 (∆Zi,t-1) +
ϵi,t …(2)

54
55

https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis.
The least-square estimation technique is not suitable because E(αi | si,t-1) ≠ 0.
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where ∆ represents the first difference (∆si,t-1 = si,t-1 - si,t-2) , and thus ∆si,t-1 is the first-difference in
the log of nominal bilateral exchange rate, where the exchange rate is defined as the foreign
currency price of the euro. The notation, ∆VSTOXXt, is the first-difference in the log of the
EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index. ∆VIXt is computed as the first-difference in the log of the
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. ∆(ieurot - iothert) measures the short-term
interest rate differential for the euro and the foreign currency, ∆Zi,t represents a vector of
macroeconomic fundamentals, and ϵi,t is the error term. All of the data in this model are firstdifferenced in logs except the short-term interest rate differentials and current account balance of
the countries, which are first-differenced in levels.56
Following the literature, I include the lagged dependent variable as another regressor and
estimate equation (2) as a dynamic panel model. To estimate equation (2), a valid instrumental
variable (IV) is needed for the lagged dependent variable because the lagged dependent variable
is not strictly exogenous. The existing literature provides three main methodologies to tackle this
endogeneity: Anderson & Hsiao (1981), Arellano & Bond (1991), and Kiviet (1995). Anderson
& Hsiao’s (1981) employ the method of moment (MOM) conditions with the IV solution, but
their MOM technique constrains the researcher to incorporate only as many IVs as the number of
endogenous covariates. Anderson & Hsiao’s (1981) model allows us to use the twice lagged
dependent variable (sit-2) or twice lagged differences of the dependent variable (∆sit-2) as valid
instruments for the lagged difference of the dependent variable (∆sit-1). Anderson & Hsiao’s
(1981) estimation technique produces inefficient coefficient estimates, because this technique
does not utilize all the available moment conditions.

56

The current account balance of some sample countries is negative, so their logarithmic values do not exist. Shortterm interest rate differentials between economies are first-differenced in levels because they are already in rate
form.
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Arellano & Bond (1991) study similar datasets with small T (time dimension) and large
N (individual/country dimension), but instead use the GMM technique. These authors claim that
their model is more efficient than Anderson & Hsiao (1981) since their methodology allows
researchers to employ all lagged dependent variables and exogenous covariates as IVs. Arellano
& Bond’s (1991) methodology gives us consistent and efficient coefficient estimates as it makes
use of all available information in a sample. Kiviet (1995), further, investigates dynamic panel
data estimation and maintains that the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimation yields
efficient coefficient estimates if researchers remove the bias from the LSDV estimator.
Judson & Owen (1999) investigate the best methodology to estimate a dynamic panel
model for different macroeconomic datasets and develop a way to choose from these three
possibilities. Judson & Owen (1999) discuss that Kiviet’s (1995) LSDV is best if used on data
sets of small T and large N.57 In contrast, Judson & Owen (1999) suggest that the least squares
dummy variable estimation bias remains even if the time dimension equals thirty. Judson &
Owen (1999) determine that all estimation techniques yield better results with a larger N and T
(by using a root mean square error criterion).58 For this reason, I construct a large country sample
to include as many countries as possible. Judson & Owen (1999) find that the least squares
dummy variable estimation only works similarly to other estimation alternatives when T equals
thirty, and does not perform better than others when T is smaller than thirty. Arellano & Bond’s

Judson & Owen (1999) maintain that microeconomic panel datasets have “far smaller T and far greater N than the
typical macroeconomic panel” (p. 9). Therefore, researchers might need different estimation techniques when
studying macroeconomic panel datasets.
58
Judson & Owen (1999) find “for a sufficiently large N and T, the differences in efficiency, bias, and RMSEs of
the different techniques become quite small.” (p. 13).
57
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(1991) methodology (the GMM technique) is the best estimation technique when T equals
twenty, because it generates the lowest root mean square error.59
In my research, the spot exchange rate of a sample economy reflects a currency’s price
per euro over the period and is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. The dependent variable “s” is defined as the national currency/euro rate. For this
reason, a rise in the dependent variable reflects an appreciation of the euro and a fall denotes the
euro’s depreciation.
The EURO STOXX 50 index incorporates the performance of the 50 largest companies
from the original eleven members of the Eurozone.60 The VSTOXX uses the option contracts of
the EURO STOXX 50 index to measure the volatility of the EURO STOXX 50 Index over a
future time horizon (STOXX, 2018). Similarly, the VIX reflects the volatility of the S&P 500
Index in percentage points, as the VSTOXX does.
Both of these volatility indices calculate the implied volatility across all eligible stock
options from the weighted average of forward prices of out-of-the-money S&P 500 and EURO
STOXX 50 puts and calls. CBOE (2017) and STOXX (2018) measure volatility by multiplying
the expected 30-day variance of their particular stock market return by 100.61 Figure 5, in the
Appendix, shows that the VIX is historically lower than the VSTOXX, even though they remain
at their peak values during the Great Recession period. However, the VSTOXX and VIX series
hint at different sets of information perhaps due to how the European sovereign debt crisis (a
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My recession estimation period contains 16 quarters whereas my post-recession model spans 23 quarters to
estimate equation (2).
60
These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
61

The purpose and calculation of the VSTOXX and VIX are similar to each other. The derivation of these volatility
indices are further detailed in the Appendix A and Appendix B.
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spillover of the Great Recession) is reflected in the VSTOXX and the VIX. The VSTOXX data
was obtained from Stoxx’s and investing.com webpage, whereas the VIX data is available at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database.62
The variable, ∆(ieurot - iothert) measures short-term interest rate differentials of non-euro
countries. In this way, I am able to see the impact of carry trades on bilateral euro exchange
rates. I download this data from the OECD database and IMF’s IFS database.63
The vector, Zi,t-1 includes some non-euro-country-specific macroeconomic indicators.
These are foreign exchange reserves (FX), the inflation rate (CPI), exports to the Euro area
(EXP), imports from the Euro area (IMP), GDP growth (GDPG), and the current account balance
(CA). The foreign exchange reserves (FX) of non-euro economies denote available foreign
currency denominated assets (including the euro value of special drawing rights but excluding
gold) controlled by the country’s monetary authority. FX reserves data is found at the IMF’s
International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity database and is referred to foreign
currency reserves (in convertible foreign currency).64 The log differences of non-euro countries’
CPI gives us the inflation rate.65 The data for CPI and FX is acquired through the IMF’s IFS
database.
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https://www.stoxx.com/document/Indices/Current/HistoricalData/h_v2tx.txt

https://www.investing.com/indices/stoxx-50-volatility-vstoxx-eur-historical-data.
63

Money market rates for Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Romania, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Serbia, Singapore, and
Thailand from the IMF’s IFS database are used to represent short-term interest rates. For the remaining economies,
the short-term interest rate in the OECD’s database is used.
64
I download the FX data for India and Serbia in the IMF’s IFS database as official reserve assets (including gold
deposits), because these countries do not have data in the IMF’s International Reserves and Foreign Currency
Liquidity database. Russian FX data is found at the IMF's International Liquidity and Foreign Reserves database as
official reserve assets and other foreign currency assets.
65
Argentina's CPI is downloaded from Moody's database as CPI (2015=100):
https://www.economy.com/argentina/consumer-price-index-cpi.
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I do not to include the net foreign asset position (NFA) as another macroeconomic
indicator, even though the NFA is commonly used when testing for safe haven flows. I exclude
the NFA from my dataset, because its transformation is already included in the form of the
current account balance.66
Non-euro GDP growth measures output and is obtained from the OECD database.67 CA
of non-euro countries measures whether the particular country is a net borrower or net lender
with respect to the rest of world.68 CA data is obtained from the IMF’s Balance of Payments and
International Investment Position Statistics database. EXP and IMP only consider the free-onboard value of total amount of goods exported to and imported from a country into the Euro area.
This trade data is acquired from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics webpage.69 Table 9, in
the Appendix, presents descriptive statistics for my sample variables.
Results
Baseline Results
The proper specification of my estimation model (equation 2) requires that there be no
autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. Arellano & Bond’s (1991) test for the serial
correlation structure in the errors demonstrates that we reject the null hypothesis of no
66

NFA is also referred as the net international investment position (NIIP). Tille (2003) maintains that the U.S. net
international investment position (or the net foreign asset position) could only change with variations in the dollar
value of current stocks of U.S. assets and liabilities (because some of these may be in foreign currencies). The IMF
(2014) describes NIIP as the subtraction of gold reserves and financial assets of a country’s residents in another
economy from liabilities of those residents to non-residents. Lane & Shambaugh’s (2010) conceptual framework
states that we can model the change in net foreign assets as (NFA)t – (NFA)t-1 = (Current Account)t + (Valuation
Effects). Therefore, in this study, I only use the current account balance as a regressor.
67
I found Romania’s GDP growth data at the Romania National Institute of Statistic’s webpage:
http://www.insse.ro/cms/en/content/gross-domestic-product.
68
Having denoted the net acquisition of foreign assets, negative CA balance shows that a country is a net borrower
(a net lender when it is positive). CA of some economies indicate negative values in their datasets, and therefore it is
not possible to find their logarithmic values.
69
The imports of Serbia from the Euro area data is discontinued and does not have any observation after the first
quarter of 2015.
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autocorrelation of order one and fail to reject no autocorrelation of order two. This means that
the specified model is appropriate, and the instruments are valid for dynamic panel model
regressions, because E (ϵi,t ϵi,t-1) does not need to be zero as the ϵi,t are first differences of serially
uncorrelated errors. The GMM estimation procedure relies on the assumption that E (ϵi,t ϵi,t-2) =
0, namely the errors are not serially correlated of order two (Arellano & Bond, 1991).70
Table 10 reports benchmark results for the Great Recession and its aftermath.71 During
the last financial crisis and after the recession, the euro appears to be a safe haven only if the
source of uncertainty is not the Euro area (is the other area which in this model is the US). An
increase in the VIX reflects an increase in the volatility of the S&P 500 Index. This finding
implies that the euro appreciates while the U.S. sourced market uncertainty rises during and in
the aftermath of last Great Recession. On the other hand, if the Euro-area sourced uncertainty
increases, the euro depreciates during and after the Great Recession. The negative and significant
coefficient on the VSTOXX might suggest that investors move out from the euro when the
market uncertainty originates in the Euro area.
My chapter further shows that non-euro economies’ inflation rate (CPI) has a positive
and significant impact on the behavior of the euro after the Great Recession. This result
unsurprisingly indicates a significant relationship between the inflation rate and depreciation of a
national currency against the euro. This positive and significant coefficient on CPI underlines the
importance of interconnected stable exchange rates and price stability targets of a monetary

70

I show the auto-correlation test results under Table 11 in the Appendix.
In order to be a valid regression pertaining to the Great Recession period, I need to incorporate second, third,
fourth, and fifth lags of the dependent variable to account for first-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors.
The post-recession model contains the second lagged dependent variable as an additional regressor. Models that
have only the first lagged dependent variable fail to reject no auto-correlation of order two.
71
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authority to tackle huge currency fluctuations at uncertain times (such as the European sovereign
debt crisis).
I also find significant results for the control variables of equation (2) that influence
exchange rate behavior. During the Great Recession, the euro significantly depreciates if noneuro foreign exchange reserves (FX) increase. The negative and significant impact of FX on the
euro is consistent with Fratzscher’s (2009) results on the U.S. dollar. I further find that the
coefficient on the imports from the Euro area (IMP) is negative and significant for the recession
period. This finding indicates that if a country increases its total value of imports from the Euro
area (i.e., if the Euro-area’s exports to the individual countries in my sample increase), this
country’s currency appreciates vis-à-vis the euro at the time of the Great Recession and may
serve as a reflection of the ability of these countries to buy from the Euro area in those hard
times. However, my study does not find any potential impact of other conditioning factors that
influence exchange rates, namely the non-euro CA balance, the non-euro GDP growth, and
exports to the Euro area on the bilateral exchange rate of the euro.
The insignificant coefficient on short-term interest rate differentials might imply that
carry trade activities play no role in the behavior of the euro. On the other hand, valuation effects
(that could emerge from changes in asset prices or exchange rates) arising from the existing
holdings of foreign assets and liabilities may be the reason for this insignificant effect of CA on
the euro (Tille, 2003; Lane & Shambaugh, 2010). If a national currency depreciates against the
euro, then this would improve the CA balance of this economy as its assets denominated in the
euro would gain value in accordance to valuation effects.
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Investor’s Choice as Safe Haven
Having determined that the euro is a safe haven when the uncertainty does not originate
in the Euro area (when originates in the US), we need to figure out which potential safe haven
assets (that can be bought and sold in euros) are really chosen by world investors. I investigate
the relationship between potential safe haven instruments and the European stock market
behavior in an attempt to detect investors’ safe haven choices. The safe haven assets considered
in this section are precious metals (such as gold and silver) and, the Euro-area government bonds
at different terms to maturity. Having constructed instruments to make volatility tradable, the
VSTOXX and VIX futures options could be additional safe haven alternatives.72
Some studies examine the safe haven status of gold by comparing its returns to returns of
other precious metals and the VIX futures. Baur & Lucey (2010) and Baur & McDermott (2010)
are the first to define and demonstrate how to test for gold’s potential to serve as a safe haven
and hedge. Hood & Malik (2013), Baur & McDermott (2016) followed up on that methodology
and confirm the safe haven status of gold against the U.S stock market. Baur & McDermott
(2016) is the only study that considers and confirms gold’s safe haven option for the Euro area
by studying the G7 economies. Baur & McDermott (2016) more extensively study the safe haven
status of gold and consider government bonds as possible safe haven instruments. Baur &
McDermott (2016) find that the three-month U.S. T-bill, and the ten-year U.S. T-bond are other
safe haven options if the S&P 500 has a worse return than the one percent quantile of the stock
return distribution.73

72

Stoxx (2018) and Whaley (2009) explain how the VSTOXX and the VIX reflect the future volatility of European
and U.S. stock markets.
73
Baur & Lucey (2010) use daily data from November 30, 1995 to November 30, 2005, and Baur & McDermott
(2016) use data from 2005 to 2010. Baur & McDermott (2010) employ data from March 2, 1979 to March 2, 2009,
whereas Baur & McDermott (2016) cover from January 1970 to December 2013.
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I follow the safe haven and hedge asset definitions by Baur & Lucey (2010), Baur &
McDermott (2016), and Hood & Malik (2013). According to their definitions, I classify the asset
as a safe haven if its returns are negatively correlated with stock returns at the time of extreme
stock market declines. Additionally, these articles state that if the correlation of the return on an
asset and the stock market return is negative and significant, on average, this implies that the
asset is a hedge.74 To conduct a similar analysis in the spirit of these papers, I estimate the
following regression
∆asseti,t = β0 + β1 (∆EUROSTOXX50t) + β2 (∆Zt) + δ1 Dq10 *(∆EUROSTOXX50t) + δ2
Dq5 *(∆EUROSTOXX50t) + δ3 Dq1*(∆ EUROSTOXX50t) + ϵt …(3)
where asseti,t represents the return on a potential safe haven asset, ∆EUROSTOXX50t is the
Euro-area stock market return, ∆Zt denotes the vector of other potential safe haven assets’ return.
Following the literature, I interact the EURO STOXX 50 return with the three-dummies that
indicate extreme negative stock market downturns by calculating the first, five, and tenpercentage-quantiles of the European stock market return. As an example, Dq1 equals 1 if the
Euro-area stock market return is below the first-percentage-quantile of the return distribution of
the EURO STOXX 50.75
In the spirit of Baur & McDermott (2016), I chose the following assets to include; gold
and silver as precious metals; VIX and VSTOXX futures; the three-month, the one-year, the two-

74

There are alternative definitions of safe haven and hedge assets in the current literature (see Baur & Lucey (2010),
Baur & McDermott (2016), and Hood & Malik (2013) for these alternative definitions). These articles define their
assets as weak and strong alternatives. An asset is classified as a weak safe haven if its return is not affected by the
stock returns during extreme stock market downturns. My paper is simply limited to strong safe haven assets. We
are not concerned of weak safe haven and hedge potential of these assets.
75
I estimate the equation (3) separately for each potential safe haven asset with robust standard errors if
heteroskedasticity is present using the Breusch & Pagan’s (1979) test. My results under Table 13 in the Appendix
reflect that I reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity for gold, silver, 7-year and 10-year bond. I find
homoskedasticity of all error variances for the VIX and VSTOXX futures; 3-month, 1-year, 2-year, 5-year bonds.
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year, the five-year, the seven-year, and the ten-year Euro-area government bonds.76 The return
on potential safe haven assets other than the Euro-area government bond returns are firstdifferenced in their logs. By contrast, yield curves of the Euro-area government bond returns are
first-differenced in levels.77 The important coefficients for us to consider are β1 and deltas. A
negative and significant β1 indicates that the corresponding asset is a hedge while the asset
becomes a safe haven if one or more deltas turn out to be negative and significant.
I use monthly data from September 2004 to December 2016 as this is the data that is
available. Table 12, in the Appendix, presents the findings concerning which assets are safe
havens.78 According to these results, none of these potential safe haven instruments turn out to be
a significant safe haven asset from the perspective of world investors. Specifically, the Euro-area
government bonds are not chosen as a safe haven asset at periods of extreme negative returns of
the EURO STOXX 50 Index. This result suggests that investors use the euro as a safe haven only
in cash (as the positive and significant coefficient on the VIX suggests from Table 10), because I
could not show any significant impact that implies a safe haven behavior of these Euro-area
assets (all of my deltas are insignificant except 7-year bond which is positive and significant)79.

76

These Euro-area government bonds show the yield curve spot rates at different terms to its maturity. The source of
this data is the European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse. Gold prices data is acquired from World Gold
Council’s webpage (https://www.gold.org/data/gold-price). The source webpage of investment.com for the silver
prices is https://www.investing.com/commodities/silver.
77
These Euro-area government bonds have AAA ratings.
78
Table 12, in the Appendix, shows the results for regression of particular potential safe haven assets on the return
on EURO STOXX 50 Index, safe haven dummies, and other potential safe haven assets. These safe haven dummies
denote extreme negative stock market returns below the 1, 5, and 10-percent-quantile of the EURO STOXX 50
Index’s return distribution. These bonds are all AAA rating Euro-area central government bonds at different terms to
maturity.
79
According to the previous literature, the positive and significant delta implies that the asset is a diversifier asset.
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Conclusion
My paper empirically analyzes the safe haven status of the euro exchange rate against
thirty-three currencies. Several different time periods were chosen using different methodologies.
During the Great Recession and in its aftermath, my paper demonstrates that the euro qualifies as
a safe haven if the source of market uncertainty is not the Euro area. The European single
currency becomes a safe haven when the United States is the origin of market uncertainty.
I derived this conclusion from testing the euro relative to thirty-three currencies to see
whether it is a safe haven or not from 2007 to the end of 2016. I found that the euro is a safe
haven during this time period as long as uncertainty does not originate in the Euro area
(originates in the US). Because I found that the euro is a safe haven currency, I continued to
investigate potential safe haven assets of the Euro-area (other than cash) using the Euro STOXX
50 Index from September 2004 to the end of 2016 as a measure of uncertainty. According to this
analysis, I cannot describe any of the potential Euro-area assets as safe havens. I, thus, show
some significant evidence that the euro is a safe haven currency against thirty three currencies
during and after the Great Recession, with global investors staying in the euro as a safe haven in
cash only (given the positive and significant coefficient on the VIX embodies in the main
regression equation (2)).
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Appendix A. The VSTOXX Calculation
The VSTOXX calculation is as follows:

𝜎𝑖 2 =

2
𝑇

∑𝑗

∆𝐾𝑖,𝑗

2
𝐾𝑖,𝑗

𝑒 𝑅𝑖 𝑇 𝑀𝐾𝑖,𝑗 −

1
𝑇

[

𝐹𝑖
𝐾𝑖,0

− 1]2

where

σ is VSTOXX/100 so that VSTOXX = σ × 100,
T is the time to expiration and equals to calculated as seconds remaining EURO
STOXX 50 Index expirations divided to total seconds in a year,
Fi is forward at-the-money price for the ith EURO STOXX 50 option’s
expiration,
K0 is highest strike price below the forward index level (F), Ki is strike price of
the ith out-the-money option from the S&P 500 puts and calls. A call if Ki > K0; and a put
if Ki < K0; both put and call if Ki =K0. ∆Ki =

𝐾𝑖+1 − 𝐾𝑖−1
2

in which ∆K for the lowest

strike is simply the difference between the lowest strike and the next higher strike.
Equivalently, ∆K for the highest strike is the difference between the highest strike and
the next lower strike. Thus, ∆K is half the distance between the two strikes adjacent to K.
R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration (refinancing factor). 𝑀𝐾𝑖,𝑗 is the
inclusion price with strike Ki whereas 𝑀𝐾𝑖,0 indicates the midpoint of put and call prices
of the option with strike Ki.
Notes: Source is STOXX (2018).
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Appendix B. The VIX Calculation
The VIX calculation is as follows:

𝜎2 =

2
𝑇

∑𝑖

∆𝐾𝑖

𝐾𝑖2

𝑒 𝑅𝑇 𝑄 (𝐾𝑖 ) −

1
𝑇

[

𝐹
𝐾0

− 1]2

where
σ is VIX/100 so that VIX = σ × 100,
T is the time to expiration and calculated as minutes remaining S&P 500 Index
expirations divided to total minutes in a year,
F is forward at-the-money price desired from the S&P 500 Index option prices,
K0 is first strike below the forward index level (F), Ki is highest strike price of the
ith out-the-money option from the S&P 500 puts and calls. A call if Ki > K0; and a put if
Ki < K0; both put and call if Ki =K0. ∆Ki =

𝐾𝑖+1 − 𝐾𝑖−1
2

in which ∆K for the lowest

strike is simply the difference between the lowest strike and the next higher strike.
Equivalently, ∆K for the highest strike is the difference between the highest strike and
the next lower strike. Thus, ∆K is half the distance between the two strikes adjacent to K.
R is the risk-free interest rate to expiration (refinancing factor),
Q (Ki) is the midpoint of the bid-ask spread for each option with strike Ki.
Notes: Source is CBOE (2015) and CBOE (2017).
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Appendix C. Plots of Volatility Indices and Main Results
Figure 5. Plot of the VSTOXX & VIX
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Notes: The VIX is the CBOE’s volatility index, a U.S, market uncertainty variable, and the
VSTOXX represents EURO STOXX 50’s volatility index for the Euro-area market uncertainty
indicator. These volatility indexes are in volatility points. See Appendix A and Appendix B for
details on how these indices are computed.
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Table 8. Country Sample of Essay Two
Albania

Mexico

Argentina

New Zealand

Australia

Norway

Brazil

Peru

Canada

Philippines

Chile

Poland

Colombia

Romania

Czechia

Russia

Denmark

Serbia

Hungary

Singapore

Iceland

South Africa

India

Sweden

Indonesia

Switzerland

Israel

Thailand

Japan

the United Kingdom

South Korea

the United States

Malaysia
Notes: I exclude China, Costa Rica, Egypt, Guyana, Jamaica, Lebanon, Paraguay, Qatar, Senegal
and Trinidad & Tobago due to data availability. Following the literature, I incorporate countries
that maintain soft peg and floating exchange rate regimes. IMF (2017) categorizes conventional
pegs and exchange rate stabilized arrangements as some soft peg examples. Anchor currency is
the most commonly used type of exchange rate stabilized arrangement. IMF (2017) defines an
exchange rate stabilized arrangement as an exchange rate that could change within a margin of
two percent for at least six months or more. A two-percent alteration could be helpful to
demonstrate safe haven status of the euro.
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Table 9. Summary Statistics of Essay Two

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

Euro exchange rate

1.31

1.052

-0.174

4.21

CBOE’s Volatility Index

1.292

0.149

1.097

1.753

EURO STOXX Volatility Index

1.388

0.122

1.204

1.75

-3.114

4.067

-35.616

4.481

2,126,944

15,543,349

-45,909,406

Foreign exchange reserves

4.525

1.08

-3.087

6.087

Inflation Rate

0.004

0.005

-0.014

0.059

Exports to the Euro area

3.685

0.608

1.661

4.805

Imports from the Euro area

3.712

0.632

1.719

4.954

GDP Growth

0.738

1.246

-7.55

8.828

Interest rate differentials
CA Balance

112,903,615

Notes: All model variables are in logs except short-term interest rate differentials and CA
balance of sample economies.
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Table 10. Benchmark Results of the Essay Two’s Dynamic Panel Model
Recession Results

(January 2007 – March 2011)

Post-Recession Results (April 2011 – December2016)

1st lagged dependent variable

0.843 (<0.001) *

1st lagged dependent variable

0.832 (<0.001) *

2nd lagged dependent variable

-0.43

(0.001) *

2nd lagged dependent variable

-0.201 (<0.001) *

3rd lagged dependent variable

0.159 (0.151) *

3rd lagged dependent variable

N/A

4th lagged dependent variable

-0.07

(0.349)

4th lagged dependent variable

N/A

5th lagged dependent variable

-0.06

(0.884)

5th lagged dependent variable

N/A

VIX

0.096 (0.004) *

VIX

0.143 (<0.001) *

VSTOXX

-0.095 (0.032) *

VSTOXX

-0.119 (<0.001) *

FX

-0.071 (0.044) *

FX

-0.052 (0.093)

Interest rate differentials

0.001

(0.844)

Interest rate differentials

-0.002 (0.231)

CPI

0.147

(0.256)

CPI

0.381 (<0.001) *

GDPG

0.001 (0.613)

GDPG

0.001 (0.219)

EXP

-0.008 (0.709)

EXP

-0.03

IMP

-0.083 (0.008) *

IMP

-0.018 (0.675)

CA

0.001 (0.579)

CA

-0.002 (0.105)

Constant

1.044 (0.001) *

Constant

(0.168)

0.109 (0.709)

Notes: The table shows the coefficient estimates and the p-values in the parenthesis. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 11. Auto-correlation Test Results for Benchmark Model of Essay Two (Equation 2)
Autocorrelation Test Order

p-value for the recession era

p-value for the post-recession era

Test Order 1

<0.001

<0.001

Test Order 2

0.395

0.115

Test Order 3

0.112

0.15

Test Order 4

0.137

0.212

Test Order 5

0.665

0.565

Notes: Due to the inclusion of the second, third, fourth and fifth lagged dependent variables, we
have to test the hypothesis of no auto-correlation of order 3, 4, and 5 (addition to order 2).
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Table 12. Results for the Investors’ Choice as Safe Haven Analysis of Essay Two (Equation 3)
Variable

Hedge

Safe haven at the Safe haven at the Safe haven at the
1% quantile
5% quantile
10% quantile

Potential Safe
Haven Asset

EURO STOXX
50 Coefficient
Estimate
(p-value) - β1

Stock Return
Dummy
Quantile at the
1% - δ1

Stock Return
Dummy
Quantile at the
5% - δ2

Stock Return
Dummy
Quantile at the
10% - δ3

-0.012
(0.395)
0.01
(0.745)
-0.014
(0.999)
0.005
(0.338)
-0.055
(0.366)
-0.004
(0.904)
0.023
(0.262)
-0.481
(0.119)
0.008**
(0.008)
-0.022
(0.085)

0.023 **
(0.019)
-0.035
(0.115)
-0.49
(0.28)
-0.005
(0.89)
-0.015
(0.717)
-0.001
(0.971)
-0.005
(0.735)
0.155
(0.466)
-0.002
(0.482)
0.005
(0.588)

-0.01
(0.188)
-0.003
(0.863)
-0.414
(0.748)
-0.002
(0.951)
-0.024
(0.458)
-0.015
(0.454)
0.014
(0.183)
0.108
(0.51)
-0.001
(0.782)
-0.001
(0.917)

Gold

-0.034
(0.726)
Silver
-0.167
(0.447)
VIX Futures
-0.407
(0.737)
VSTOXX Futures 0.01
(0.978)
3-month bond
-0.287
(0.489)
1-year bond
-0.296
(0.255)
2-year bond
0.306 **
(0.023)
5-year bond
-0.926
(0.122)
7-year bond
0.046
(0.168)
10-year bond
-0.119
(0.161)

Notes: ** indicates that the instrument is a diversifier asset.
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Table 13. Breusch & Pagan’s (1979) Heteroskedasticity Test Results of Essay Two (Equation 3)
Dependent Variable – Potential Safe Haven

p-value for the Heteroskedasticity Test

Asset (∆asseti,t)
Gold

0.856

Silver

0.33

VIX Futures

0.04

VSTOXX Futures

0.001

3-Month Bond

0.001

1-Year Bond

0.004

2-Year Bond

0.006

5-Year Bond

0.03

7-Year Bond

0.123

10-Year Bond

0.271

Test Hypothesis: H0 : The error variances are all equal (homoscedasticity)
H1 : The error variances are not equal (heteroscedasticity)
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CHAPTER IV
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INTERACTIONS AFTER THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EURO
The purpose of my study is to investigate international monetary policy interactions since
the advent of the euro. My research tries to explain whether monetary authority actions of the
U.S. and the Euro area (E.A.) generate foreign monetary policy endogeneity in G7 economies
after the introduction of the euro. In addition, this chapter considers spillover effects of the
Federal Reserve’s (Fed) and the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies from one
economy to macroeconomic fundamentals of each other and other G7 countries. Following Kim
(2001), policy endogeneity refers to the systematic monetary authority reaction of one economy
(that persists for at least two time periods) following a monetary policy innovation of the other.
To further analyze the international monetary policy transmission mechanism of the largest
central banks, I investigate the influence of a monetary policy change on output, the trade
balance, and the exchange rate of these major industrialized economies. I refer to these detailed
transmission channels as spillover effects of monetary policy innovations.80
The findings of my paper denote that the E.A. becomes more influential during the
unconventional monetary policies era, because expansionary innovations in the ECB’s assets
create an endogenous policy reaction on the monetary policy authorities of the US, Japan, and
the U.K.81 However, exogenous E.A. conventional monetary policy shocks do not cause an
endogenous reaction in the US, Canada, and Japan, but only lead to foreign monetary policy
80

I do not require two months persistence to define spillover effects on output, trade balance, and exchange rate of
G7 economies following monetary policy shocks of the Federal Reserve and ECB.
81
The Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England give an endogenous reaction after two months,
following the ECB’s unconventional expansionary shock. The response of the Canadian monetary authority does not
show any significant impact after a similar shock.
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endogeneity in the U.K. Exogenous U.S. conventional contractionary monetary policy
innovations, instead, significantly cause an endogenous reaction to the all non-US G7 monetary
authorities.82 However, U.S. unconventional expansionary monetary shocks only lead to an
endogenous monetary policy reaction in Japan. My paper is important, because its empirical
results imply that the EA has been successful in terms of becoming a counterpart to the US
during unconventional monetary policies period (2009-2015), a motivating factor for the
construction of the monetary union and common currency. However, the results of my chapter
suggest that the EA has been unsuccessful in becoming a counterpart to the US during
conventional monetary policy era (1999-2008), since the non-US G7 economies pursue an
endogenous monetary policy response following a U.S. conventional monetary policy shock
before the Great Recession. This finding implies that US is still the origin of monetary policy
shocks during the current conventional monetary policy period (2015-2020). Krugman et al.
(2012) state that the EA expected to secure its own economic benefits by establishing a joint
monetary system, because the US, as a world banker, was more interested in solving its own
problems after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. This result suggests that this did not
happen before the Great Recession.
Central banks influence each other, and sometimes this interaction leads to similar policy
implementation from the different monetary authorities. For instance, the ECB may implement
monetary expansion following U.S. monetary expansion, or vice versa. Coeuré (2016) argues
that the new level of economic and financial integration might modify effects and spillovers from
monetary policies, because, ceteris paribus, more policy coordination is required for a higher

82

The endogenous reactions of monetary policy authorities in the EA and Canada have one month lag, whereas the
U.K and Japanese response have 10 months lag following U.S. conventional contractionary innovations.
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level of globalization. Nevertheless, Engel (2016) discusses that the goal of policy coordination
is not to get rid of spillovers and emphasizes that policy cooperation is not necessarily inevitable
despite the existence of spillovers. Thus, foreign monetary policy endogeneity is a testable
hypothesis for the U.S. and the E.A. monetary authorities.
My research studies the transmission of the U.S. and the E.A. monetary policy decisions
on each other’s policy implementations by analyzing both conventional and unconventional
actions of the largest central banks. Kim (2001) examined this link during the pre-euro period
and found that G6 monetary authorities did not respond to U.S. monetary policy shocks. My
study takes into account the post-euro period and inspects whether the ECB is more resilient to
U.S. monetary policy shocks compared to the pre-euro period. This chapter also explores
whether, in the post-euro period, the ECB impacts the behavior of the remaining three non-euro
G7 countries’ monetary policy decisions (Canada, Japan, and the UK). I define conventional
monetary policy shocks as either the U.S. or the E.A. monetary contraction, specifically
increasing the Fed Funds Rate or the Euro-area short-term policy rate. Unconventional monetary
policy shocks, instead, are defined as the U.S. or the E.A. monetary expansion, namely
increasing the amount of their central bank assets. I define conventional monetary policy shocks
as contractionary and unconventional monetary policy shocks as expansionary only due to the
needs at the time.83 Following Kim (2001), I apply the marginal method employing a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model in which every international and/or foreign variable is included one
by one to the benchmark VAR model. Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16 provide a summary of
the results of my study.
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The Fed increased the Fed Funds Rate, and the ECB raised its short-term policy rate in 1999 and 2000.

89

Table 14 summarizes my finding concerning how monetary policy shocks of the Fed and
the ECB spill over to each other and to the remaining G7 economies. The columns of Table 14
refer to the type and source of monetary policy change, so that we can compare spillovers’ origin
and kind. For example, the first row shows the impact of monetary policy innovations on the
Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), which is the main variable of volatility
in my research. Specifically, the third and fourth column of the first row tell us that U.S. and E.A.
conventional monetary contractions have insignificant outcomes on market uncertainty.
Table 15 summarizes my findings investigating whether U.S. and E.A. conventional
monetary policy innovations result in an endogenous policy reaction in G7 economies. In this
table, the third and fourth columns allow us to analyze the similarities and differences between
the impacts of conventional monetary policy shocks. For instance, the third row shows that E.A.
conventional monetary innovations result in an endogenous response to the monetary authority
of Canada.
Table 16 summarizes my results concerning the impact of unconventional U.S. and E.A.
monetary shocks in G7 economies. We could compare the effects of the Fed and the ECB by
looking at the third and fourth columns of Table 16. The fourth row, for example, clarifies that
Japanese monetary policy-makers follow the Fed and the ECB.
Engel (2016) states that the Federal Reserve’s expansionary policy during the Great
Recession and its aftermath assisted to reduce the liquidity crunch and provided safe conditions
for world investors to seek for profitable opportunities. A U.S. monetary expansion might lead to
negative results in other economies due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Specifically, such
expansionary monetary policy raises domestic inflation making the U.S. dollar depreciate. A
dollar depreciation promotes U.S. exports by making U.S. goods cheaper and reduces U.S.
90

imports. Additionally, a U.S. expansionary monetary policy decreases domestic short-term
interest rates causing capital outflows from the United States and capital inflows elsewhere.
These capital inflows positively influence the output level of other countries, where short-term
interest rates are higher than the US.84 Even though, the direction of spillovers (positive or
negative correlation) from expansionary monetary policy is not clear, one still needs to determine
if there are any spillover effects on economies (Engel, 2016). Therefore, do conventional and
unconventional monetary policies of the largest central banks have an impact on the other bank,
and do those actions create spillovers on other large advanced economies?
Literature Review
Kim (2001) studies international transmissions of U.S. monetary policy shocks for the
flexible exchange rate period using VAR models. Kim’s (2001) estimation covers the period
from 1974 to 1996, and includes the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
UK, and the US). Kim (2001) applies the marginal method where each international variable is
added one by one to the benchmark model. The author shows that U.S. expansionary monetary
policies create positive impacts on the output of the non-US G7 economies. Kim (2001) tests
foreign policy endogeneity, but finds that the endogenous reaction of non-US monetary
authorities to U.S. monetary policy is not very strong. Kim (2001) reports that the trade balance
does not play a major role in transmitting U.S. monetary policy shocks to the non-US G7
countries. Canova (2005) also inspects international transmissions of U.S. shocks, yet analyzes
effects of these transmissions on Latin American economies. Canova’s (2005) results reveal that

84

The short-term policy interest rates of non-Euro G7 economies were higher than the US, except Japan, during
conventional monetary policy period (1999-2008). The E.A. short-term policy rate was higher than the Federal
Funds Rate in 2001 (from June to December), 2002, 2003 (January to October), 2004 and 2008. The Federal Funds
Rate was higher than the E.A. short-term policy rate in 1999, 2000, 2001 (from January to June), 2003 (November
& December), 2005, 2006, and 2007.
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U.S. contractionary monetary shocks cause contemporaneous increases in Latin American shortterm interest rates.
Kucharcukova et al. (2016) examine the influence of conventional and unconventional
European Central Bank (ECB) policy changes on six European Union (E.U.) countries outside
the Euro area.85 The novelty of Kucharcukova et al. (2016) is in introducing the method of
principal factor analysis in which they calculate an indicator for the monetary policy stance from
information based on interest rates, monetary aggregates, selected ECB balance sheet items, and
exchange rates. These authors find that an ECB monetary tightening reduces the industrial
production of six non-Euro-area countries. The article also demonstrates that the response of
national short-term interest rates to a conventional monetary policy shock is significant for all six
of these E.U. economies. On the other hand, Kucharcukova et al. (2016) do not find any
significant evidence of the impact of an unconventional monetary policy shock on national shortterm interest rates, and thus maintain that there is no endogenous monetary policy response of
ECB unconventional monetary shocks in the neighboring countries.
Similarly, Jannsen & Klein (2011) analyze how Euro-area monetary policy innovations
impact non-Euro-area economies from western Europe.86 However, Jannsen & Klein (2011)
show that non-Euro-area short-term interest rates rise after a contractionary ECB monetary
policy shock. Jannsen & Klein’s (2011) results also reveal that there is more noticeable spillover
of ECB monetary policy shocks on non-Euro-area output after the introduction of the euro.
Vespignani (2015) observes the effects of monetary shocks in the US, China, and Japan
on the Euro area for the period 1999 – 2012 in a structural VAR (SVAR) analysis. The article

85
86

These economies are Czechia (Czech Republic), Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
These western European countries are Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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displays that Euro-area industrial production decreases with positive shocks of the U.S. M2 and
Japan’s M2, but a positive innovation in China’s M2 creates a positive impact on the Euro-area
output. Vespignani (2015) does not present any significant results for the effects of monetary
innovations of these countries on the Euro-area short-term interest rate. Likewise, Sousa &
Zaghini (2008) study the international spillover effects of foreign monetary innovations on the
Euro-area economy in a SVAR framework. Sousa & Zaghini (2008) calculate a measure of
liquidity outside the Euro area by considering the US, Japan, the UK, and Canada as foreign
economies. A global liquidity variable is computed by subtracting the logarithm of real GDP of
these non-Euro-area G7 economies from their logarithm of the weighted sum of monetary
aggregates. Sousa & Zaghini (2008) find that Euro-area output increases in the period following
innovations in global liquidity. Sousa & Zaghini (2008) further show that a positive shock to
global liquidity causes a significant and permanent rise in the Euro-area M3.
Neri & Nobili (2010) investigate the impact of changes in the U.S. monetary policy
stance on the Euro area employing a SVAR model from 1982 to 2007. Neri & Nobili’s (2010)
results demonstrate that the euro depreciates due to a U.S. contractionary monetary policy shock.
Moreover, these authors maintain that the trade balance is not a key factor in the transmission of
U.S. monetary policy changes to the euro area, which is in line with Kim’s (2001) findings. In
Neri & Nobili’s (2010) research, there is limited evidence of foreign monetary policy
endogeneity, because a positive innovation in the Federal Funds Rate leads to an increase in the
Euro-area short-term interest rate in the next period.
Maćkowiak (2007) also discusses the effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks, but studies
how these shocks affect emerging markets by incorporating a SVAR analysis. Maćkowiak
(2007) tries to determine the role of U.S. monetary policy shocks relative to some other external
93

shocks jointly on eight emerging countries.87 Maćkowiak (2007) demonstrates that innovations
of U.S. monetary policy are less influential on emerging markets relative to other kinds of
external shocks.
Gambacorta et al. (2014) take a different approach and examine the influence of
unconventional monetary policies in a panel VAR framework. The estimations of Gambacorta et
al. (2014) are from January 2008 to June 201188 and include Canada, the Euro area, Japan,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the US. This article reports that an exogenous
shock to the unconventional monetary policy tool leads to a rise in output in the following
period. Additionally, Gambacorta et al. (2014)’s findings indicate that innovations to central
bank assets explain a small portion of output and price variability.
My study follows Kim’s (2001) marginal method, because I argue that it is a better
approach than including all international variables into the benchmark model at the same time.
Doing so would result in a dimensionality problem.89 In all empirical analyses of my chapter,
using small VAR models is a better approach as it allows for the preservation of degrees of
freedom.
My research adds substantial value to the current literature. First, my project tries to
explain international monetary interactions with the onset of the euro as a single currency. This
period has not been examined before. Second, my paper expands beyond focusing on the period
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These economies are Chile, Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Gambacorta et al. (2014) use monthly data.
89
If I include all variables (9 variables for a VAR model) at the same time, the degrees of freedom would decrease
to 30 with one lag, which prevents obtaining reliable results. However, the marginal method has 90 degrees of
freedom with one lag, and 65 degrees of freedom with 2 lags.
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of the Great Recession when unconventional monetary policy actions took place. I further
compare conventional and unconventional monetary policies in the post-euro era.
Data & Model
I use monthly data from January 1999 to December 2015. My sample economies are
Canada, the Euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The nineteen members
of the Eurozone are included as a single entity. I apply a different analysis according to monetary
policy developments. The post-euro period consists of two different monetary policy behaviors
of central banks, namely conventional and unconventional monetary policies. Conventional
monetary policy becomes useless after short-term nominal interest rates get stuck at their
effective lower bounds (or the zero-lower bound), and central bank balance sheets take the place
of the traditional monetary policy instrument. Monetary authorities in advanced economies have
implemented accommodative monetary actions such as quantitative easing (Gambacorta et al.,
2014; Coeuré, 2016). Hence, conventional monetary policy period covers from January 1999 to
December 2008, while unconventional monetary policy era spans from the first month of 2009 to
December 2015. After December 2015, the Federal Reserve (Fed) started to raise short-term
interest rates again, so that we are faced with conventional monetary policies until recently.
However, the European Central Bank (ECB) still uses its unconventional monetary policy tools
(such as the asset purchasing program) and keeps its short-term interest rate at the zero-lower
bound as of March 2020.
Canada is the only sample country that did not adopt unconventional monetary policy
tools during the Great Recession. Gordon (2017) states that lower debt-to-equity ratios of the
Canadian banks relative to their counterparts helped them to defend against insolvency in the
crisis. The Bank of Canada decreased its short-term policy rate from 3 to 2.5 percent and then
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kept reducing the rate until reaching the zero-lower bound in April 2009. The Canadian
monetary authority preserved a conditional commitment to remain at the zero-lower bound until
the middle of 2010 and did not need to implement unconventional monetary measures (Gordon,
2017).
I use a VAR model to analyze international monetary interactions and make separate
VAR analyses for the effects of the U.S. and the E.A. monetary policies in different sections.
Following Kim (2001), I assume that the economy is described in a way that each model variable
depends on the lag of its own and all other macroeconomic variables in the model
St = B(L) St-1 + Ut

… (1)

where B(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, St is an (n*1) data vector, and Ut is an
(n*1) structural disturbance vector. The vector, Ut, is serially uncorrelated and var(Ut) = Ω
(symmetric positive definite matrix) which is a diagonal matrix with the variances of structural
disturbances along its diagonal.90 I estimate the following reduced form VAR equation
St = G(L) St-1 + et

… (2)

where G(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and var(et) = ∑ (symmetric positive
definite matrix). The vector, St, contains short-term policy interest rate (INTRATE)91 or central

Any positive definite symmetric matrix can be decomposed into A’ A where A is upper triangle matrix and A’ is
the transpose of this matrix. A has 1s along its main diagonal. D, as being unique diagonal matrix with positive
diagonal element, can be written such that Ω = A’ D A. Then we can write var(Ut) = A’ D1/2 D1/2 A. This is Choleski
decomposition where var (Ut) = P’ P and P is the Choleski root at var-cov matrix of Ut. I need to find the pure
impact of the true innovations of exogenous U.S. and E.A. monetary changes on each endogenous variable. I, thus,
must have uncorrelated monetary shocks implying a pure orthogonalized innovation. A pure orthogonalized
innovation shows a completely unpredictable effect from past observations and totally uncorrelated with any
indicator that affects the economy. I need to orthogonalize U ts to find the impulse response functions of pure shocks
in U.S. and E.A. monetary policy tools. I define Vt = P-1 Ut where Vt is the orthogonalized innovation because E(Vt)
= 0 and var(Vt) = I.
91
I define conventional monetary policy tool as short-term policy interest rates. Short-term policy interest rate is the
Federal Funds Rate for the US. The Euro-area short-term interest rate is the E.A. monetary policy rate. I define the
90
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bank assets (CBA)92, industrial production (IP), consumer price index (CPI), global price index
(GPI).93 I use X-13-ARIMA-SEATS software package of the U.S. Census Bureau to eliminate
seasonality from my data sample (except short-term interest rates).94
The Choleski decomposition is used to orthogonalize residuals from the VAR models to
compute impulse response functions (IRF). I estimate a separate VAR model for Japan, Canada,
and the UK. The identification of the U.S. and the E.A. monetary policy shocks follows Kim
(2001) and Kucharcukova et al. (2016), who use recursive restrictions on the contemporaneous
impact of monetary policy shocks on other model variables. The Choleski ordering for the
benchmark model is as follows: IP, CPI, GPI, INTRATE (or CBA). Thus, the U.S. and the E.A.
monetary policy shocks come last in the ordering of my benchmark model. This ordering
suggests that IP has a contemporaneous impact on all system variables, but CPI, GPI, INTRATE
can affect IP only through a lag. Following Kim (2001) and Kucharcukova et al. (2016), I
assume that these domestic macroeconomic fundamentals are contemporaneously exogenous to
the monetary policy instrument of the US and the EU. Kucharcukova et al. (2016) state, “The
identification of the spillover effect of monetary policy shocks from the large economy on the
small open economy comes from the restriction of the impact of domestic shocks on the foreign
economy” (p.210).95 Following Kim’s (2001) marginal method, I add each international variable
to the above benchmark model one by one. Every international variable, which I try to
investigate the impact of U.S. and E.A. monetary policy shocks on, comes last in the ordering. I,

rest of G7 sample economies’ short-term policy interest rates as their three-month money market rates because the
data for required monetary policy rates is not available.
92
Unconventional monetary policy tool is defined as central bank assets of the sample G7 economies in this paper.
93
The Federal Funds Rate (FFR) shows the interest rate at which banks lend Federal Reserve funds to each other on
an overnight basis. The Euro-area short-term policy rate depends on three main key interest rates that are the main
refinancing operations, the deposit facility, and marginal lending facility rates.
94
I used the R studio’s interface to X-13-ARIMA-SEATS to acquire final seasonally adjusted series.
95
Kucharcukova et al. (2016) define the domestic economy as small open economy in their article.

97

therefore, put the restriction of other G7 shocks on U.S. and E.A. economies, because their
economies are larger than other G7 countries. G7 domestic shocks have no contemporaneous
effect on U.S. and E.A. economies in my estimations.
I estimate different VAR models to investigate exogenous shocks to the monetary policy
tools of the Fed and ECB. My benchmark VAR model for the impact of U.S. monetary policy
shocks includes USIP, USCPI, GPI, and FFR (or USCBA). I estimate another benchmark VAR
model that includes EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE (or EURCBA) to see the effect of
Euro-area monetary policy shocks. In my estimations, IP serves as an indicator for output. 96
INTRATE represents the conventional monetary policy tool, whereas CBA is the unconventional
monetary policy instrument. CPI is the average change in the prices of U.S. or E.A. market
basket of consumer goods purchased by their urban consumers. I include GPI97 to guard against
the price puzzle.98 The nominal exchange rate (EXCHRATE), trade balance (TBAL), and the
Chicago Board of Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) are the international variables that I add to
my benchmark models one at a time.99 All the sample variables are logged other than short-term
interest rates, which is in levels.100
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IMF (2018) defines IP as an index that contains manufacturing & electricity, mining & quarrying, and gas &
water according to the UN International Standard Industrial Classification.
97
GPI is the IMF’s All Commodity Price Index (2005 = 100).
98
The price puzzle refers to the positive response of the price level to a rise in short-term interest rates. This
relationship is puzzling, because one would expect that an increase in short-term interest rates would reduce
aggregate demand, which would decrease inflation. To eliminate the price puzzle, the previous literature such as
Sims (1992), Kim (2001), and McMillin (2001) opted to include another measure of price level.
99
The S&P 500 Index shows the performance of the 500 largest corporations in terms of free-float market
capitalization. The VIX aims to record an instantaneous measure of the level of implied volatility of the S&P 500
Index over the next 30 days. Therefore, VIX is an international variable in this chapter as it reflects the performance
of the largest U.S. and non-US G7 corporations.
100
The trade balance of Japan is expressed in levels in unconventional monetary policy analyses spanning from
2009 to 2015 because it was negative in June 2013.
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The VIX indicates the volatility of the S&P 500 index to detect the influence of monetary
policy shocks on market uncertainty. EXCHRATE and TBAL would help us to be able to
examine the international transmission of the largest monetary policy authorities through
bilateral finance and trade channels. In analyses of the effect from U.S. monetary policy changes,
the nominal exchange rate of a country represents the national currency price per the U.S. dollar
(national currency/dollar), whereas in analyses for the impact of the ECB’s policy shocks the
exchange rate corresponds to the value of the national currency in terms of the euro (national
currency/euro).
I obtain GPI, FFR, CBA, and the U.S. dollar exchange rates against other G7 economies
data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Euro exchange rates vis-à-vis the U.S., Canada,
and Japan are downloaded from the Eurostat’s webpage101, whereas the euro exchange rate
against the U.K. pound is found at the Bank of England’s database.102 IP, TBAL, CPI are
acquired from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database.103 I download the Euro-area short-term policy rate from the Eurostat’s webpage.104
Short-term interest rate of non-EU G7 data is available at the OECD database. I download the
VIX data from the Yahoo Finance’s webpage.105
Kilian & Lutkepohl (2017) maintain that there are two main problems that cause
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) to be misleading. These authors state that ADF tests have low
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https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/exchange-and-interest-rates/data/database.

102

https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/FromShowColumns.asp?Travel=NIxAZxI3x&FromCategoryLi
st=Yes&NewMeaningId=REURO&CategId=6&HighlightCatValueDisplay=Exchange%20rate%20(spot)%20%20Euro%20into%20sterling.
103
I obtain the Euro-area output from the Eurostat’s database.
104
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/exchange-and-interest-rates/data/database.
105

https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EVIX/history?period1=915148800&period2=1485820800&interval=1mo&filter
=history&frequency=1mo.
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power for rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity, which in turn could lead to overdifferencing data. Kilian & Lutkepohl (2017) argue that researchers cannot use the ADF results
to confirm model properties identified under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Sims et al.
(1990) also demonstrate that the common transformation of models to stationary form by
differencing data is unnecessary in many cases.
Kilian & Lutkepohl (2017) maintain that a VAR model in levels is the best approach for
near-unit root processes, and the estimator of this model continues asymptotically valid in the
existence of possible unit roots and cointegration. Gospodinov et al. (2013) demonstrate that
estimates based on the VAR specification in levels perform better than the VAR model in first
differences, except for the root equal to one (unit-root). I use VAR models in log-levels (except
short-term interest rates) to estimate IRFs, because Gospodinov et al. (2013) emphasize using the
importance of VAR specification in levels as it produces valid inferences on IRFs when the
researcher is uncertain about the integration and cointegration properties of his/her data.
I estimate a standard VAR model using OLS. In addition, the Schwarz information
criterion (SIC) is used to determine the lag length. The SIC advocates having one, two, and three
lags depending on VAR models. Moreover, Box & Pierce’s (1970) multivariate portmanteau test
is conducted to check the serial correlation in the residuals of each VAR estimation. The serial
correlation test results reveal that the residuals are independent. I show the test results for lag
selection and autocorrelation between errors in Table 17, 18, 19, and 20 under the Appendix A.
I report the empirical results of my research using IRFs in the Appendix B. Two standard
error confidence bands (95%) of IRF’s are constructed from the one thousand bootstrap runs. I
estimate my VAR model and save estimation (fitted) residuals as my first step. Second, I draw
uniformly from the series of fitted residuals and set this bootstrap residual equal to the first
100

selected realization of the fitted residual. I, thereafter, take a second draw by replacing the fitted
residual with the bootstrap residual again. I repeat this process one-thousand times and collect
one-thousand realizations to construct bootstrap time series recursively. I use this sample to
construct my bootstrap confidence bands at the 5th and 95th percentile of its distribution. All of
the IRFs indicate no reaction after the second year. Thus, I present all the IRFs of this study up to
the thirtieth month for visual ease.
Results
The Impact of U.S. Conventional Monetary Policy Shocks (1999-2008)
This model uses monthly data from January 1999 to December 2008. The benchmark
VAR model in this section contains U.S. output, U.S. consumer price index, a global price index,
and the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). The FFR is the conventional monetary policy tool of the
Federal Reserve.106 As I mentioned above, the benchmark model has a Choleski ordering of
{USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR}. After identifying the U.S. monetary policy shock, each international
variable is added to this benchmark model one at a time.107 In the VAR models of this section,
the nominal exchange rate is defined as domestic currency per U.S. dollar (i.e., yen/U.S. dollar).
Figure 6 shows that contractionary shocks to U.S. conventional monetary policy appreciate the
U.S. dollar against the euro in between the twentieth and twenty-fifth month. USIP significantly
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Policy endogeneity refers to the systematic monetary authority reaction of a non-US G7 economy (that persists
for at least two time periods) following a U.S. conventional contractionary shock. I do not require at least two
months reaction to define spillover effects on output, trade balance, and exchange rate of non-US G7 economies
following similar shocks.
107
I show the lag selection and portmanteau test results for this section in Table 21 under Appendix A.
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increases from the fifth month up to the twelfth month, and USCPI has significant increase in
between the eleventh and the eighteenth month.108
Figure 7 displays the response of the VIX and the Euro-area macroeconomic
fundamentals to a contractionary U.S. monetary policy innovation. The short-term policy rate of
the Euro area shows some significant response in the second and third month following a
contractionary U.S. conventional monetary policy innovation. This finding indicates that the
Euro-area short-term policy rate response is not significantly different from 0 with 95%
probability in the first month, but gives a significant reaction in the following two months after
U.S. conventional contractionary monetary policy shocks. Therefore, there is enough evidence to
suggest foreign monetary policy endogeneity with one month lag, because the European Central
Bank increases short-term policy rate in the following second and third months due to a U.S.
conventional contractionary shock. On the other hand, the Euro-area IP significantly increases in
between the sixth and twelfth months due to a positive shock in the FFR, and does not show any
significant response before these periods. However, the Euro-area trade balance does not indicate
any significant reaction after a U.S. conventional contractionary monetary policy shock.
Additionally, Figure 7 reflects that a contractionary innovation in the FFR does not lead to any
significant response in the VIX.
Figure 8 (for Canada), Figure 9 (for Japan), and Figure 10 (for the UK) show the IRFs of
other G7 countries. These figures denote some evidence of foreign monetary policy endogeneity
for Canada with one month lag, but for Japan and the UK with ten months lag. Figure 8 shows
that the short-term interest of Canada increases in the following eighteenth months due to a U.S.
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GPI has significant increase in between the eleventh and the seventeenth month following a U.S. conventional
contractionary monetary policy shock.
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conventional monetary contraction. According to Figure 9 and Figure 10, the response of
Japanese and U.K. short-term interest rate are insignificant until the eleventh month following a
U.S. conventional contractionary monetary policy shock, but they have significant increases in
between the eleventh and eighteenth periods.
Figure 9 indicates that the IP of Japan increases due to a U.S. monetary contraction shock
in following the ninth month, but does not show any significant response before this period. U.K.
output increases significantly after the sixth month following a U.S. conventional contractionary
monetary policy shock, and does not have significant reaction before this month. The output of
Canada does not have any significant response following a contractionary shock to the FFR.
According to Figure 8, the trade balance of Canada improves significantly at the end of
first year following a U.S. conventional monetary policy shock, and does not show any
significant response before the eleventh month. The Japanese trade balance has a significant
improvement in between following the tenth and fourteenth months. The U.K. trade balance
significantly worsens in the third month, and improves in the fourth month due to a U.S.
conventional contractionary shock. Exogenous contractionary shocks in the FFR in addition
cause significant deprecation in the yen, but leads to a significant appreciation in the Canadian
dollar against the U.S. dollar in between following the eleventh and fourteenth months.109
Similar U.S. contractionary monetary policy shocks do not lead to any significant impact on the
exchange rate of pound vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar in the following twenty-first month.
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The Canadian dollar and yen against the U.S. dollar do not show any significant response until the eleventh
month following a U.S. conventional contractionary shock.
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The Impact of E.A. Conventional Monetary Policy Shocks (1999-2008)
This analysis has the same time period and sample of the countries as the previous one,
but I intend to see the influence of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) conventional monetary
policies. Hence, the benchmark VAR model includes the Euro-area output, the Euro-area
consumer price index, the global price index, the Euro-area short-term policy rate, and is
assumed to have a Choleski ordering of {EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE}.110 I included
every international variable one by one to the above benchmark model after identifying the Euroarea monetary policy shock as was the case for the US in the last section.111 In this analysis, the
nominal exchange rate represents national currency units per euro (i.e. yen/euro). Figure 11
reports the results for this benchmark model, which only show a significant effect of the
European Central Bank’s conventional monetary policies on the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate
because the other Euro-area domestic variables do not show any significant response following a
contractionary E.A. conventional monetary policy shock.112
Figure 12 presents the IRFs for the US and the VIX. According to these IRFs, an
exogenous contractionary shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate produces an initial rise in
the FFR, but becomes insignificant in the second period. Therefore, the response of FFR does not
imply an endogenous reaction of the Federal Reserve (Fed) to E.A. conventional monetary
policies in the post-euro era following the first period. USIP decreases in between the third and
fifteenth months, but turns to positive after the second year due to a contractionary innovation to
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Policy endogeneity refers to the systematic monetary authority reaction of a non-euro G7 economy (that persists
for at least two time periods) following an E.A. conventional contractionary shock. I do not require at least two
months reaction to define spillover effects on output, trade balance, and exchange rate of non-EA G7 economies
following similar shocks.
111
I present the lag selection and portmanteau test results for this section in Table 22 under Appendix A.
112
The euro appreciates in the sixth month, but depreciates from the seventh to ninth month following a Euro-area
conventional monetary policy shock, and does not show any significant reaction other than these periods.
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the Euro-area short-term policy rate.113 In addition, E.A. conventional contractionary shocks do
not lead to any significant response in the U.S. trade balance and VIX.
Figure 13 (for Canada), Figure 14 (for Japan), and Figure 15 (for the UK) show the IRFs
for other G7 economies following a contractionary innovation in the Euro-area short-term policy
rate. Figure 13 shows that the Canadian short-term interest rate significantly increases in the first
three months due to a Euro-area conventional contractionary monetary policy shock.114 Figure 14
reveals that E.A. conventional contractionary monetary policy innovations do not lead to any
significant impact in the Japanese short-term interest rate. According to Figure 15, the reaction of
monetary authority in the UK does not reflect any significant response until the eleventh month,
but becomes negative and significant in between the eleventh and eighteenth months following a
Euro-area conventional monetary policy shock. Thus, there is some evidence for an endogenous
policy reaction of Canada and the UK (except Japan) to the Euro-area.
Moreover, the contractionary shock to the ECB’s conventional monetary policy tool does
not induce a significant response in the output of non-US G7 economies other than the UK. The
U.K. output significantly decreases after the first month due to an E.A. conventional
contractionary shock. The spillover effect of E.A. contractionary conventional monetary
innovations is more evident on the trade balances of these non-US G7 economies (except
Japan).115 The trade balance of Canada improves in the third month, whereas the U.K. trade
balance worsens in the same month following a contractionary shock to the Euro-area short-term
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The U.S. output does not show any significant reaction due to an E.A. conventional contractionary monetary
policy shock in the first two months.
114
The Canadian short-term interest rate decreases in the fourth and fifth months, but turns to insignificant in the
sixth month.
115
The Japanese trade balance does not show any significant response following E.A. conventional monetary policy
shocks.
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policy rate.116 The currencies of these G7 economies (except Canada) reflect some significant
reaction against the euro after Euro-area conventional monetary policy innovations.117 The pound
significantly depreciates against the euro in between the eighth and eighteenth months following
E.A. conventional monetary contractions. The Japanese yen is also insignificant in the following
eighteenth month, but depreciates after this period due to a similar E.A. contractionary shock.
The Impact of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks (2009-2015)
This section analyzes effects of changes in U.S. unconventional monetary policies using
monthly data from 2009 to 2015, because unconventional monetary policies have taken into
action with the Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchases (The Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, 2017). The benchmark VAR model employs U.S. output, U.S. consumer price index, a
global price index, and the Federal Reserve (Fed)’s assets by initiating a Choleski ordering of
{USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA}.118 As was the case for the previous sections, I include every
international variable one at a time to the benchmark VAR model.119 Figure 16 denotes that U.S.
unconventional monetary policy innovations do not create any significant influence on the
domestic economy. However, the U.S. dollar depreciates (the euro appreciates) in the month
following an expansionary shock in U.S. central bank assets, but becomes insignificant in the
second month.120
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Trade balances of Canada and the UK do not show any significant response in the first two months after E.A.
conventional monetary contractions.
117
The response of Canadian dollar does not turn significant in any time period.
118
Policy endogeneity refers to the systematic monetary authority reaction of a non-US G7 economy (that persists
for at least two time periods) following a U.S. unconventional expansionary shock. I do not require at least two
months reaction to define spillover effects on output, trade balance, and exchange rate of non-US G7 economies
following similar shocks.
119
I show the lag selection and portmanteau test results for this section in Table 23 under Appendix A.
120
The nominal exchange is defined as the value of national currency in terms of the U.S. dollar, i.e. yen/U.S. dollar,
in this section.
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Figure 17 gives us the IRFs for the VIX and Euro-area macroeconomic fundamentals to an
expansionary shock in the Fed assets. The European Central Bank assets do not show any
significant response following a U.S. unconventional expansionary monetary policy shock. Figure
17 also indicates that an U.S. unconventional expansionary monetary policy shock does not
generate any significant impact in the output and trade balance of the Euro-area. Moreover, I do
not find any significant reaction in the VIX after a U.S. unconventional expansionary monetary
policy innovation during the Great Recession and its aftermath.
Figure 18 (for Canada), Figure 19 (for Japan), and Figure 20 (for the UK) show effects of
changes in U.S. unconventional monetary policies on other G7 countries.121 The evidence of
foreign monetary policy endogeneity is only significant for Japan out of non-US G7 economies.
The central bank assets of Japan have significant increases in the first three months following a
U.S. unconventional expansionary monetary policy shock.122 U.S. unconventional expansionary
monetary policy innovations do not lead to any significant response to the U.K. and Canadian
monetary authorities. In addition, U.S. unconventional monetary shocks do not cause spillovers
on these non-euro G7 countries, since I do not find any significant reaction in the exchange rate
against the euro, output, and trade balances of these economies.
The Impact of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks (2009-2015)
In this section, the benchmark VAR model includes the Euro-area macroeconomic
fundamentals to see the influence of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) unconventional
monetary policies. I include the Euro-area output, the Euro-area consumer price index, a global
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The U.K. central bank assets data are limited and contain only observations up to September 2014.
The response of Japanese central bank assets stay stable in the fourth and fifth months, and turn to insignificant
after this period.
122
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price index, and the ECB’s assets in this benchmark model. The Choleski ordering is as follows:
{EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA}.123 I applied the same methodology as in the earlier analyses
by employing the marginal method.124 Figure 21 reports that shocks in the Euro-area central
bank assets do not have any significant impact on the domestic economy. However, the euro
depreciates (the U.S. dollar appreciates) in the following month due to an exogenous change in
the ECB’s assets, but appreciates in the second, third, and fourth months.
Figure 22 demonstrates a set of IRFs for the VIX and the US. I find that U.S. central bank
assets have significant decreases starting from the third month up to the ninth month following an
exogenous E.A. unconventional monetary policy shock, but this response does not show any
significant response other than this time interval.125 Thus, there is some evidence to imply an
endogenous reaction of the Federal Reserve (with two months lag) to an exogenous unconventional
expansionary monetary shock from the ECB. Unconventional Euro-area monetary expansions,
instead, do not generate spillovers in the US, because I show no significant response in the U.S.
output and trade balance.126
Figure 23, Figure 24, and Figure 25 show the IRFs for Canada, Japan and the UK to an
exogenous Euro-area unconventional expansionary policy shock. An expansionary innovation to
the ECB’s assets induces an endogenous policy reaction (with two months lag) in the monetary
authority of Japan and the UK, but does not have any significant impact in Canada.127 For this
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Policy endogeneity refers to the systematic monetary authority reaction of a non-euro G7 economy (that persists
for at least two time periods) following an E.A. unconventional expansionary shock. I do not require at least two
months reaction to define spillover effects on output, trade balance, and exchange rate of non-EA G7 economies
following similar shocks.
124
I present the lag selection and portmanteau test results for this section in Table 24 under Appendix A.
125
U.S. central bank assets do not have any significant reaction in the first two months due to a Euro-area
unconventional expansionary monetary policy shock.
126
I do not find any significant impact of E.A. unconventional expansionary monetary shocks on the VIX.
127
The central bank assets of Japan and the UK do not show any significant response after a Euro-area
unconventional expansionary monetary policy shock in the first two months. The Japanese central bank assets
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reason, Euro-area conventional monetary policy changes are more powerful than E.A.
unconventional policy innovations in terms of generating foreign monetary policy endogeneity in
non-US G7 economies.
Figure 25 shows that the U.K. output has some significant decreases in between the
eleventh and eighteenth months following a Euro-area unconventional monetary policy
expansion. In addition to the U.K. output, a Euro-area unconventional expansionary monetary
policy shock only spills over to the exchange rates of non-US G7 economies, because I find no
significant response in the output (except UK) and trade balance of these economies. However,
innovations to the ECB’s assets appreciate the Canadian dollar, and the pound against the euro
starting from the first month, but significantly appreciate the yen in the second month following
an exogenous Euro-area unconventional expansionary monetary policy innovation.128
Robustness Checks
Following Vespignani (2015), I replace the global price index (GPI) with a global crude
oil price, which was obtained from the IMF’s primary commodity prices data.129 In this way, I
investigate the robustness of earlier results by replacing the GPI with a comparable supply index
that I represent with the global crude oil price (Vespignani, 2015). Overall, the results seem
robust (from Figure 26 to Figure 93 in the Appendix C) other than seven cases (from Figure 94
to Figure 100 in the Appendix C).

decrease in the following three months, whereas U.K. central bank assets increase in the following three months due
to E.A. unconventional monetary expansions.
128
The Japanese yen does not show any significant response in the first period following E.A. unconventional
monetary policy expansions.
129
The IMF primary commodity prices data was downloaded from
http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx.
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Four cases are related to the existence of autocorrelation between errors. I find that the
VAR models investigating the impact of E.A. conventional monetary contractions on the FFR,
Japanese trade balance, and short-term interest rate estimated with the oil price instead of GPI
fail from autocorrelation tests when the lag length is same as the marginal method estimation.130
I, therefore, increase the lag length, but find different results to the IRFs of marginal method
estimations. I include the industrial inputs price index (IPI) and substitute it with the oil price in
these three experiments. I show that the VAR models with the IPI in the place of oil price do not
have any serial correlation between errors (when the lag length is the same as the marginal
method) and produce similar responses to their marginal method estimation.131 I also find
different result for the impact of E.A. unconventional monetary policy shocks on the U.S. output
if I include the price of oil rather than GPI into my estimation model. The U.S. output does not
show any positive response after the second period when I estimate it with the price of oil instead
of GPI. Similarly, I estimate the U.S. output by replacing the oil price with IPI, but this VAR
model fails from autocorrelation test when the lag equals to the marginal method estimation. I,
thus, increase the lag length and present very similar response to the marginal method
estimation.132
The other three cases that show different results with the price of oil instead of the GPI
further amplify the importance of using the IPI rather than the oil price as a substitute to the GPI.
The IRF of Canadian trade balance demonstrates different response in the first month following a

130

I use the same lag length of marginal method estimation in these robustness checks to compare substitutability of
GPI and the oil price.
131
Figure 94 for the FFR, Figure 95 for the Japanese trade balance, and Figure 96 for the short-term interest rate of
Japan show the IRFs of these VAR models in the Appendix C.
132
Figure 97 shows that the VAR model estimated the U.S. output with IPI gives us a similar IRF to the marginal
method estimation even though the lag length are not the same. The VAR model of marginal method estimation has
one lag whereas the model with IPI contains two lags.
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Euro-area conventional monetary policy shock when I estimate it with the oil price in the place
of GPI. However, this response becomes very similar to the IRF of marginal method estimation
when I substitute the oil price with the IPI.133 The influence of U.S. unconventional monetary
expansions on the Euro-area output is different when I introduce the price of oil instead of GPI.
An exogenous unconventional U.S. monetary expansion produces no response on the Euro-area
output when I use the price of oil instead of GPI.134
I further find that the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary policy shocks on the output
of Canada indicates different results when I estimate the Canadian output with the oil price rather
than the GPI. The small negative impact on the Canadian output in the next period due to an
exogenous U.S. monetary expansion vanishes when it is included with the price of oil instead of
the GPI. I, thus, replace the oil price with IPI (as was the case in the above experiments), and
find that the IRF of Canadian output estimated with the IPI gives us similar results to the
marginal method estimation.135 One explanation could be the behavior of the price of oil during
2009 and 2010, which was less stable than GPI. The standard deviation of the price of oil is
0.304 that is higher than GPI’s standard deviation (0.222) during the same period. For this
reason, I add the industrial inputs price index (IPI) to replace GPI in the above estimations,
because its movement is closer to GPI than the price of oil.136 Therefore, unlike Vespignani’s
(2015) proposal, these robustness checks suggest that the industrial inputs price index is a better
substitute for the GPI than the price of oil for the post-euro era.

133

Figure 98 presents the results of these IRFs under the Appendix C.
Figure 99 shows the IRFs of these VAR models in the Appendix C.
135
I present the IRFs of these estimations in Figure 100 under the Appendix C.
136
The standard deviation of the industrial inputs price index is 0.19 for this period.
134
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Following Kim (2001), I added every international variable to the benchmark VAR
model one by one.137 I further investigate the robustness of earlier findings by including two and
three international variables at the same time to consider some interactions between these
variables. I present all robustness check results in the Appendix C. The results denote similar
responses to the previous impulse response functions (IRF) when I estimate two international
variables in the same VAR model (from Figure 26 to Figure 93 in the Appendix C), except one
case. The IRF of the trade balance of Japan is different when this trade balance interacts with the
central bank assets of Japan as an additional international variable than only including the
Japanese trade balance following a U.S. conventional monetary policy shock. The trade balance
of Japan improves more than the IRF of marginal method estimation when I estimate it with the
central bank assets of Japan. I believe that we observe more positive response on the Japanese
trade balance due to the increase in the central bank assets of Japan following a U.S.
unconventional monetary policy shock. I believe that the IRF estimated the trade balance of
Japan as only international variable is more realistic scenario than adding the Japanese central
bank assets as another international variable, because I expect a significant worsening of
Japanese trade balance after a U.S unconventional monetary innovation.138
IRFs of including three international variables together in the same model are not robust
in 4 cases. The effect of E.A. conventional monetary contractions on the exchange rate of the
Canadian dollar against the euro imply different reaction when it is included with the Canadian

137

My benchmark VAR model for the impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks includes USIP, USCPI, GPI, and FFR
(or USCBA). I estimate another benchmark VAR model that includes EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE (or
EURCBA) to see the effect of Euro-area monetary policy shocks.
138
Figure 101 shows the results of these IRFs in the Appendix C. I also present that the VAR models which replace
the central bank assets of Japan with the Japanese output and yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate demonstrate different
responses than the marginal method estimation.
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output and trade balance.139 The appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the euro in the next
month following a Euro-area conventional monetary policy shock almost disappears when I
estimate it with the Canadian output and trade balance. I believe that the IRF estimated the
Canadian dollar exchange rate against the euro as only international variable is more realistic
case, because I expect an appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the euro in the following
month due to a Euro-area conventional monetary contraction.
The IRF of trade balance of Canada is different following an exogenous E.A.
conventional monetary policy shock if I include it with the Canadian dollar vs euro exchange
rate and short-term interest rate of Canada into the same VAR model. The trade balance of
Canada increases after the first period due to a Euro-area conventional monetary shock when I
estimate it with the euro exchange rate of the Canadian dollar and short-term interest rate of
Canada. I believe that the Canadian trade balance would worsen in the first two periods due to
capital outflows from Canada to the Euro-area (as the IRF only included Canadian trade balance
shows in Figure 3.8). The IRF of three Canadian international variables together shows that the
trade balance of Canada improves after the first period because of the appreciation of the
Canadian dollar against the euro and increase in the short-term interest rate of Canada.140
The impact of an exogenous U.S. unconventional monetary policy shock on the trade
balance of Japan suggests different findings when I estimate this trade balance with the yen vs
U.S. dollar (USD) exchange rate and central bank assets of Japan than its marginal method

139

I also find different results when I estimate the exchange rate of Canadian dollar vs. euro with the Canadian
output and short-term interest rate of Canada. I present these IRFs in the Figure 102 under the Appendix C.
140
I show different findings when I estimate this exchange rate with the Canadian output and short-term interest rate
of Canada. I present the IRFs of these VAR models in Figure 103 under the Appendix C.
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estimation.141 I believe that the trade balance of Japan improves (instead of worsening) in the
first period, because of the appreciation of yen against the USD and increase in central bank
assets of Japan.142 I believe that the IRF included the Japanese trade balance as only international
variable is more realistic scenario because I expect the Japanese trade balance to worsen in the
first period and to improve after this period due to the endogenous reaction of the Bank of Japan
to the Federal Reserve. Similarly, U.S. unconventional monetary policy shocks create different
impact on the exchange rate of yen against the USD in the first period when I include it with the
trade balance and output of Japan in the same model. I believe that the IRF included the yen
against USD exchange rate as only international variable is more realistic scenario, because the
small initial appreciation of the yen against USD disappears when it is estimated with two other
Japanese variables.143 I expect an appreciation of the USD against yen in the first month
following a U.S. expansionary unconventional monetary innovation (as Figure 3.14 shows).
Conclusion
The aim of my research is to explore interactions of the largest central banks’ actions in
the post-euro era. This paper analyzes the influence of the monetary policy behavior of the US
and the Euro area (EA) on their monetary policy actions since the advent of the euro as the single
currency. I further examine whether the monetary stance of the US and the Euro area create
endogenous monetary responses and/or spillovers for other G7 countries. The results of my study
reveal that conventional contractionary monetary policy shocks of the Federal Reserve (Fed)

141

The IRF is also different than the marginal method estimation when I estimate the trade balance of Japan with the
yen/USD exchange rate and output of Japan. I present these findings in Figure 104 under the Appendix C.
142
The marginal method estimation of the Japanese trade balance (without other Japanese international variables in
this model) demonstrates that it worsens in the first period following a U.S. unconventional monetary policy shock
as Figure 19 shows in the Appendix B.
143
I find the same result when I estimate the yen vs. USD exchange rate with the trade balance and central bank
assets of Japan. I show these IRFs in Figure 3.105 under the Appendix C.
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cause foreign policy endogeneity in the Euro-area and in other non-US G7 economies. The
Canadian monetary authority significantly responds to the Fed’s contractionary shock with one
month lag, whereas the U.K. and Japanese monetary policy significantly reacts to the similar
shock after the tenth month. However, the European Central Bank (ECB)’s conventional
contractionary monetary policy innovations only cause an endogenous monetary policy
implementation in Canada at the first time period, and in the U.K. with ten months lag.
On the other hand, the exogenous U.S. unconventional monetary expansions only cause
an endogenous monetary policy action on Japan. However, expansionary Euro-area
unconventional monetary policy shocks lead to endogenous responses by the Federal Reserve,
the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan with two months lag.144 According to the findings of
my paper, the Fed significantly causes a foreign monetary policy endogeneity in the ECB
(starting from the second month) due to a U.S. conventional contractionary monetary policy
shock, but not due to a U.S. unconventional one. The ECB leads to an endogenous response on
the Fed with two months lag following a Euro-area unconventional expansionary monetary
policy innovation. Thus, I have sufficient evidence to imply that the Euro area becomes stronger
during the Great Recession and its aftermath (2009-2015). The results of my research also
suggest that there is some evidence regarding the European target of being a counterpart to the
US during unconventional monetary policy period (2009-2015).145
My chapter suggests that there is an endogenous reaction of G7 monetary authorities to
the ECB’s unconventional actions, although the design of unconventional monetary policies
differ across these economies as Gambacorta et al. (2012) state. My findings of unconventional

144

Expansionary Euro-area unconventional monetary policy innovations do not create any significant impact on the
monetary policy of Canada.
145
I don’t have enough evidence to claim that E.A. was a counterpart to the US before the Great Recession.
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monetary policy period imply that the EU has achieved the target of becoming a counterpart to
the US, which was one of the main reasons for the common European monetary union and
currency. Consequently, the results of my study empirically demonstrate the real influence of
accommodative monetary policies of advanced economies during and in the aftermath of the
Great Recession.
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Table 14. Some Spillover Effects of Monetary Policy Changes in the Post-Euro Era
Economy

Response
Variable
of the
Impacted
Economy

The Effect of U.S.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of U.S.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Expansion)

The Effect of E.A.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy Shocks
(Monetary Expansion)

US

VIX

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

US

Output
(IP)

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 6th and 12th
periods

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 3rd and 16th
periods

Insignificant

Insignificant

Euro Area

Output
(IP)

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 6th and 16th
periods

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Canada

Output
(IP)

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

121

Table 14─Continued
Economy

Response
Variable
of the
Impacted
Economy

The Effect of U.S.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of U.S.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Expansion)

The Effect of E.A.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy Shocks
(Monetary Expansion)

Japan

Output
(IP)

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 9th and 16th
periods

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 11th and
13rd periods

Insignificant

Insignificant

UK

Output
(IP)

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 6th and 16th
periods

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 3rd and 15th
periods

Insignificant

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 11th and
18th periods

Exchange Rate

Euro vis- Insignificant at the
à-vis U.S. beginning, significant in
dollar
between the 22nd and
24th periods

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 6th and 9th
periods

U.S. dollar
depreciates in the 1st
month, but
insignificant in the
2nd period

Euro depreciates in the
1st month, but
appreciates in the 2nd,
3rd, & 4th periods

US

Trade
Balance

Insignificant

N/A

Insignificant

N/A
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Table 14─Continued
Economy

Response
Variable
of the
Impacted
Economy

The Effect of U.S.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary
Policy Shocks
(Monetary Contraction)

The Effect of U.S.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Expansion)

The Effect of E.A.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy Shocks
(Monetary Expansion)

Euro Area

Trade
Balance

Insignificant

N/A

Insignificant

N/A

Canada

Trade
Balance

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 11th and
14th periods

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 3rd and 6th
periods

Insignificant

Insignificant

Japan

Trade
Balance

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 11th and
14th periods

Insignificant

Insignificant

Insignificant

UK

Trade
Balance

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
the 3rd and 4th months

Insignificant at the
beginning, significant in
between the 3rd and 12th
periods

Insignificant

Insignificant
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Table 15. The Impact of Conventional Monetary Policy Shocks in the Post-euro Era
Economy

Response
Variable of
the Impacted
Economy

The Effect of U.S.
Conventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Contraction)

Euro Area

Short-term
interest rate

Insignificant in the ↑ (because this is its
1st month, ↑ in the own shock)
2nd and 3rd periods

Endogenous
policy reaction
to the Federal
Reserve

US

The Federal
Funds Rate

↑ (because this is its ↑ in the 1st month, but
own shock)
insignificant in the 2nd
period

Not enough
evidence for
foreign policy
endogeneity

Canada

Short-term
interest rate

Insignificant in the ↑ in the 1st, 2nd, & 3rd
1st month, ↑ in the months, but ↓ after the
2nd and 3rd periods
3rd period

Endogenous
policy reaction
to the Federal
Reserve and to
the European
Central Bank

Japan

Short-term
interest rate

Insignificant in the Insignificant
first 10 months, ↑ in
between the 11th
and 18th periods

Endogenous
policy reaction
to the Federal
Reserve

UK

Short-term
interest rate

Insignificant in the
first 10 months, but
↑ in between the
11th and 18th
periods

Endogenous
policy reaction
to the Federal
Reserve and to
the European
Central Bank
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The Effect of E.A.
Conventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Contraction)

Insignificant in the
first 10 months, but ↓
in between the 11th
and 18th periods

Conclusion

Table 16. The Impact of Unconventional Monetary Policy Shocks in the Post-euro Era
Economy

Response
Variable of
the Impacted
Economy

The Effect of U.S.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Expansion)

The Effect of E.A.
Unconventional
Monetary Policy
Shocks (Monetary
Expansion)

Conclusion

Euro Area

Central bank
assets

Insignificant

↑ (because this is
its own shock)

Not enough
evidence for
foreign policy
endogeneity

US

Central bank
assets

↑ (because this is
its own shock)

Insignificant in the
two months, ↓
after the 2nd period

Endogenous policy
reaction to the
European Central
Bank

Canada

Short-term
interest rate

Insignificant

Insignificant

Not enough
evidence for
foreign policy
endogeneity

Japan

Central bank
assets

↑ in the 1st & 2nd
months, but
insignificant in the
3rd period

Insignificant in the
two months, ↓
after the 2nd period

Endogenous policy
reaction to the
Federal Reserve &
European Central
Bank

UK

Central bank
assets

Insignificant

Insignificant in the
two months, ↑
after the 2nd period

Endogenous policy
reaction to the
European Central
Bank
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Table 17. Lag Selection and Portmanteau Test Results for the Impact of U.S. Conventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR) *
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EUREXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, VIX)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKINTRATE)

AIC
Lag
Test
6
2
8
8
2
4
2
4
6
6
2
6
2
6
2
2
2
8

SIC
Lag
Test
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Portmanteau
Test p-value
0.36
0.776
0.241
0.08
0.008 **
0.683
0.773
0.712
0.158
0.592
0.744
0.277
0.844
0.352
0.501
0.304
0.709
0.241

Notes: AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion whereas SIC the Schwarz information
criterion. The second and third column give us the recommended lag selection according to these
information criterion. * VAR model is the benchmark VAR model for this section.
The null hypothesis for portmanteau test us no serial correlation between errors so that if p-value
exceeds 0.05 then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. ** represents the
VAR model that fails from autocorrelation test when the lag length equals 1. I increase the lag
length for ** VAR model, and estimate it again. I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation when the lag length equals 2. I show the IRFs for ** VAR model with 2 lags.
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Table 18. Lag Selection and Portmanteau Test Results for the Impact of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE) *
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, EURUSEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, FFR)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, VIX)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKINTRATE)

AIC
Lag
Test
3
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
7

SIC
Lag
Test
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Portmanteau
Test p-value
0.144
0.064
0.003 ***
0.134
0.002 **
0.009 **
0.09
0.352
0.019 **
0.324
0.118
0.075
0.04 **
0.001 **
0.098
0.293
0.123
0.017 **

Notes: AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion whereas SIC the Schwarz information
criterion. The second and third column give us the recommended lag selection according to these
information criterion. * VAR model is the benchmark VAR model for this section.
The null hypothesis for portmanteau test us no serial correlation between errors so that if p-value
exceeds 0.05 then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. ** represents the
VAR models that fail from autocorrelation test when the lag length equals 1. I increase the lag
length for ** VAR models, and estimate it again. I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no autocorrelation when the lag length increases to 2. I show the IRFs for ** VAR model with 2
lags. *** represents the VAR model that fails from autocorrelation test when the lag length
equals one, and also equals two. I increase the lag length to 3 for *** VAR model, and estimate
it again. I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation when the lag length
equals 3.
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Table 19. Lag Selection and Portmanteau Test Results for the Impact of U.S. Unconventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA) *
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EUREXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EURTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EURIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EURCBA)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, VIX)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNCBA)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKIP)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKCBA)

AIC
Lag
Test
2
8
8
2
8
2
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
2
2
8

SIC
Lag
Test
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Portmanteau
Test p-value
0.707
0.801
0.296
0.615
0.419
0.899
0.931
0.633
0.487
0.867
0.694
0.977
0.963
0.672
0.505
0.965
0.822
0.695

Notes: AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion whereas SIC the Schwarz information
criterion. The second and third column give us the recommended lag selection according to these
information criterion. * VAR model is the benchmark VAR model for this section.
The null hypothesis for portmanteau test us no serial correlation between errors so that if p-value
exceeds 0.05 then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.
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Table 20. Lag Selection and Portmanteau Test Results for the Impact of E.A. Unconventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA) *
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, EURUSEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USCBA)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, VIX)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNCBA)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKCBA)

AIC
Lag
Test
2
8
8
8
8
1
8
2
8
8
7
2
8
8
8
2
8
8

SIC
Lag
Test
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Portmanteau
Test p-value
0.415
0.523
0.003 ***
0.105
0.829
0.3
0.631
0.459
0.139
0.049
0.131
0.294
0.52
0.39
0.507
0.686
0.576
0.939

Notes: AIC refers to the Akaike information criterion whereas SIC the Schwarz information
criterion. The second and third column give us the recommended lag selection according to these
information criterion. * VAR model is the benchmark VAR model for this section.
The null hypothesis for portmanteau test us no serial correlation between errors so that if p-value
exceeds 0.05 then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. *** represents the
VAR model that fails from autocorrelation test when the lag length equals one, and also equals
two. I increase the lag length to 3 for *** VAR model, and estimate it again. I find that I cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation when the lag length equals 3.
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Table 21. Portmanteau Test Results of Robustness Checks for the Impact of U.S. Conventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, EUREXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, EURTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, EURIP)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, EURINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, VIX)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, CANEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, CANTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, CANIP)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, CANINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, JPNEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, JPNTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, JPNIP)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, JPNINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, UKEXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, UKTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, UKIP)
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, FFR, UKINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURIP, EUREXCHRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURTBALANCE, EURINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURTBALANCE, VIX)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EURIP, EURTBALANCE, EURINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, EUREXCHRATE, EURTBALANCE, VIX)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANIP, CANINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE, CANINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNIP, JPNINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE, JPNINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKIP, UKINTRATE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, FFR, UKIP, UKTBALANCE, UKINTRATE)

pvalue
0.681
0.398
0.109
0.203
0.629
0.49
0.241
0.806
0.592
0.69
0.124
0.745
0.522
0.271
0.411
0.596
0.443
0.477
0.248
0.251
0.32
0.252
0.938
0.27
0.964
0.871
0.642
0.779
0.709
0.899
0.709
0.557
0.623
0.468

Notes: I use the same lag length of marginal method estimations in these robustness checks.
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Table 22. Portmanteau Test Results of Robustness Checks for the Impact of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, EUREXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, USTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, USIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURINTRATE, FFR)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, VIX)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, CANEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURINTRATE, CANTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, CANIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, CANINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, JPNEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURINTRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, JPNIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURINTRATE, JPNINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, UKEXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, UKTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, UKIP)
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURINTRATE, UKINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USIP, EUREXCHRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, VIX, FFR)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USIP, USTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USIP, EUREXCHRATE, USTBALANCE)
– lag = 1
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, USIP, EUREXCHRATE, USTBALANCE)
– lag = 3
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, EUREXCHRATE, VIX, FFR)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANIP, CANINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE,
CANINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE,
CANTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNIP, JPNINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNINTRATE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
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pvalue
0.07
0.385
0.197
0.169
0.068
0.055
0.631
0.138
0.273
0.085
0.185
0.245
0.076
0.07
0.371
0.123
0.163
0.337
0.15
0.721
0.47
0.898
0.309
0.443
0.257
0.38
0.311
0.291
0.359
0.34
0.509
0.466

Table 22─Continued
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKIP, UKINTRATE) – lag = 1
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKIP, UKINTRATE) – lag = 2
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURINTRATE, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE, UKINTRATE)

0.275
0.691
0.568
0.886

Notes: I use the same lag length of marginal method estimations in these robustness checks.
Therefore, some above models have different lag length although contain same model variables
to compare their IRFs to marginal method estimations.
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Table 23. Portmanteau Test Results of Robustness Checks for the Impact of U.S. Unconventional
Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

pvalue
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, EUREXCHRATE)
0.963
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, EURTBALANCE)
0.494
(USIP, USCPI, IPI, USCBA, EURIP)
0.281
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, EURCBA)
0.669
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, VIX)
0.971
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, CANEXCHRATE)
0.848
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, CANTBALANCE)
0.625
(USIP, USCPI, IPI, USCBA, CANIP)
0.18
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, CANINTRATE)
0.972
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, JPNEXCHRATE)
0.761
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, JPNTBALANCE)
0.974
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, JPNIP)
0.988
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, JPNCBA)
0.699
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, UKEXCHRATE)
0.573
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, UKTBALANCE)
0.985
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, UKIP)
0.47
(USIP, USCPI, OIL, USCBA, UKCBA)
0.873
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EUREXCHRATE, EURTBALANCE)
0.409
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EURIP, EURTBALANCE)
0.34
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, VIX, EURCBA)
0.663
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EURIP, EURXCHRATE, EURTBALANCE)
0.485
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, EUREXCHRATE, VIX, EURCBA)
0.924
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE)
0.849
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANTBALANCE, CANINTRATE)
0.562
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
0.721
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, CANIP, CANTBALANCE, CANINTRATE)
0.194
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
0.947
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNTBALANCE, JPNCBA)
0.966
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE)
0.94
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
0.95
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE, JPNCBA)
0.923
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE)
0.693
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKTBALANCE, UKCBA)
0.936
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
0.941
(USIP, USCPI, GPI, USCBA, UKIP, UKTBALANCE, UKCBA)
0.933
Notes: I use the same lag length of marginal method estimations in these robustness checks.
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Table 24. Portmanteau Test Results of Robustness Checks for the Impact of E.A.
Unconventional Monetary Shocks
VAR Model

pvalue
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, EUREXCHRATE)
0.714
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, USTBALANCE)
0.229
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, USIP)
0.289
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURCBA, USCBA)
0.971
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, VIX)
0.942
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, CANEXCHRATE)
0.741
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURCBA, CANTBALANCE)
0.518
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, CANIP)
0.217
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, CANINTRATE)
0.544
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, JPNEXCHRATE)
0.282
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURCBA, JPNTBALANCE)
0.302
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, JPNIP)
0.828
(EURIP, EURCPI, IPI, EURCBA, JPNCBA)
0.727
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, UKEXCHRATE)
0.638
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, UKTBALANCE)
0.793
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, UKIP)
0.831
(EURIP, EURCPI, OIL, EURCBA, UKCBA)
0.783
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, EUREXCHRATE, USTBALANCE)
0.1
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, EUREXCHRATE, VIX)
0.943
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USIP, USCBA)
0.481
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USIP, EUREXCHRATE, USTBALANCE)
0.075
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USIP, EUREXCHRATE, VIX)
0.782
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, USIP, VIX, USCBA)
0.855
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
0.761
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANIP, CANINTRATE) – lag = 1
0.06
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANIP, CANINTRATE) – lag = 2
0.217
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANIP, CANEXCHRATE, CANTBALANCE)
0.379
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, CANIP, CANTBALANCE, CANINTRATE)
0.309
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
0.13
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNIP, JPNCBA)
0.356
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNIP, JPNEXCHRATE, JPNTBALANCE)
0.424
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, JPNIP, JPNTBALANCE, JPNCBA)
0.448
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE)
0.807
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKTBALANCE, UKCBA)
0.975
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA, UKIP, UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE)
0.986
(EURIP, EURCPI, GPI, EURCBA UKEXCHRATE, UKTBALANCE, UKCBA)
0.975
Notes: I use the same lag length of marginal method estimations in these robustness checks.
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APPENDIX B
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Figure 6. The Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Domestic Economy,
and the Global Price Index

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the FFR on the exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar against the euro (euro/U.S. dollar), U.S. output, U.S. CPI, and the global price index
(from 1999 to the 30th month).
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Figure 7. The Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Euro-area, and the
VIX

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the FFR on the short-term policy rate,
output, the trade balance of the Euro area, and on the VIX (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 8. The Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks on Canada

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the FFR on the exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar against the Canadian dollar (Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar), short-term policy rate,
output, and trade balance of Canada (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 9. The Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks on Japan

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the FFR on the exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen (yen/U.S. dollar), short-term policy rate, output, and trade
balance of Japan (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 10. The Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the UK

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the FFR on the exchange rate of the
U.S. dollar against the British pound (pound/U.S. dollar), short-term policy rate, output, and
trade balance of the UK (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 11. The Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Domestic Economy,
and on the Global Price Index

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate on
the exchange rate of the euro against the U.S. dollar (U.S. dollar/euro), the global price index,
output and CPI of the Euro-area (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 12. The Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the US and the VIX

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate on
the VIX, FFR, the U.S. output and trade balance (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 13. The Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks on Canada

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate on
the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar against the euro (Canadian dollar/euro), short-term
interest rate, output, and trade balance of Canada (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 14. The Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks on Japan

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate on
the exchange rate of the Japanese yen against the euro (yen/euro), short-term interest rate, output,
and trade balance of Japan (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 15. The Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks on the UK

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Euro-area short-term policy rate on
the nominal exchange of the British pound against the euro (pound/euro), short-term interest rate,
output, and trade balance of the UK (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 16. The Effect of the U.S. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Domestic
Economy, and the Global Price Index

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Federal Reserve’s assets on the
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the euro (euro/U.S. dollar), the global price index, the U.S.
output and CPI (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 17. The Effect of the U.S. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Euro-area, and
the VIX

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Federal Reserve’s assets on the
VIX, central bank assets, output, and trade balance of the Euro area (from 2009 up to the 30th
month).
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Figure 18. The Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on Canada

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Federal Reserve’s assets on the
exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the Canadian dollar (Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar), shortterm interest rate, output, and trade balance of Canada, and (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 19. The Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on Japan

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Federal Reserve’s assets on the
exchange of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen (yen/U.S. dollar), short-term interest rate,
output, and trade balance of Japan (from 2009 up to the 30th month) .
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Figure 20. The Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the UK

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the Federal Reserve’s assets on the
exchange of the U.S. dollar against the British pound (pound/U.S. dollar), short-term interest
rate, output, and trade balance of the UK (up to the 30th month). The U.K. central bank assets
data are limited and contain only observations up to September 2014.
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Figure 21. The Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Domestic
Economy, and on the Global Price Index

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the European Central Bank’s assets on
the exchange rate of the euro against the U.S. dollar (U.S. dollar/euro), the global price index,
output and CPI of the Euro-area (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
151

Figure 22. The Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the US and the VIX

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the European Central Bank’s assets on
the VIX, the Federal Reserve’s assets, U.S. output and trade balance (from 2009 up to the 30th
month).
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Figure 23. The Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on Canada

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the European Central Bank’s assets on
the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar against the euro (Canadian dollar/euro), short-term
interest rate, output, and trade balance of Canada (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 24. The Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on Japan

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the European Central Bank’s assets on
the exchange rate of the Japanese yen against the euro (yen/euro), central bank assets, output,
and trade balance of Japan (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
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Figure 25. The Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the UK

Notes: These IRFs show the impact of a positive shock to the European Central Bank’s assets on
the exchange rate of the British pound against the euro (pound/euro), central bank assets, output,
and trade balance of the UK (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
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APPENDIX C
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Figure 26. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates nominal exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the euro (euro/
U.S. dollar) with the price oil (instead of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from
1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF includes the Euro-area output, and the right
bottom one uses the Euro-area trade balance and VIX with the euro/ USD rate as robustness
checks.
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Figure 27. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Euro-area Policy Rate

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area short-term policy rate with the price oil (instead of
GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the Euro-area trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the Euro-area
output and trade balance with the Euro-area policy rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 28. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Euro-area Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area output with the price oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the euro/ USD exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the Euro-area short-term
policy rate and the trade balance with the Euro-area output as robustness checks.
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Figure 29. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Euro-area Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area trade balance with the price oil (instead of GPI) in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term policy rate, and the right bottom one uses the euro/ USD exchange rate
and the VIX with the Euro-area trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 30. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the VIX

Notes: The first IRF estimates the VIX with the price oil (instead of GPI) in the conventional
monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF includes the Euroarea trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the euro/ USD exchange rate and the Euro-area
trade balance with the VIX as robustness checks.
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Figure 31. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Short-Term Interest Rate of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Canada with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the Canadian output, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian dollar/
USD exchange rate and the trade balance of Canada with the short-term interest rate of Canada
as robustness checks.
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Figure 32. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Output of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term interest rate of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian
dollar/ USD exchange rate and the trade balance of Canada with the Canadian output as
robustness checks.
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Figure 33. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Canadian Dollar against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Canadian dollar/USD rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the trade balance of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the trade balance and
short-term interest rate of Canada with the Canadian dollar/USD rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 34. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the Canadian dollar/USD rate, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian dollar/
USD exchange rate and the short-term interest rate of Canada with the trade balance of Canada
as robustness checks.
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Figure 35. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Short-term Interest Rate of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Japan with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the Japanese output, and the right bottom one uses the yen/ USD exchange
rate and the Japanese output with the short-term interest rate of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 36. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Output of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term interest rate of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the yen/ USD
exchange rate and the short-term interest rate of Japan with the Japanese output as robustness
checks.
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Figure 37. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Yen against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the yen/USD exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the trade balance of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the trade balance and the
short-term interest rate of Japan with the yen/USD rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 38. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the yen/USD rate, and the right bottom one uses the yen/ USD exchange rate and the
output of Japan with the short-term interest rate of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 39. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Short-term Interest Rate

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. short-term interest rate with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the U.K. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. trade balance and
U.K. output with the U.K. short-term interest rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 40. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the U.K. short-term interest rate, and the right bottom one uses the pound/ USD
exchange rate and the U.K. trade balance with the U.K. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 41. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Pound against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the pound/USD exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the U.K. trade balance the right bottom one uses and the U.K. output and
U.K. trade balance with the pound/ USD rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 42. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the pound/ USD exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the pound/ USD exchange
rate and the U.K. output with the U.K. trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 43. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of the U.S. Dollar against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the USD/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.S. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.S. output and U.S. trade
balance with the USD/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 44. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Federal Funds Rate (FFR)

Notes: The first IRF estimates the FFR with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the conventional
monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF includes the VIX,
and the right bottom one uses the VIX and USD/euro exchange rate with the FFR as robustness
checks.
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Figure 45. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.S. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.S. output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the USD/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the USD/euro exchange rate
and U.S. trade balance with the U.S. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 46. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.S. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.S. trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the U.S. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.S. output and the USD/euro
exchange rate with the U.S. trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 47. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the VIX

Notes: The first IRF estimates the VIX with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the conventional
monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF includes the FFR,
and the right bottom one uses the FFR and USD/euro exchange rate with the VIX as robustness
checks.
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Figure 48. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Short-term Interest Rate of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Canada with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the Canadian output, and the right bottom one uses the output of Canada
and Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the short-term interest rate of Canada as robustness
checks.
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Figure 49. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Output of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term interest rate of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the short-term
interest rate of Canada and Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the output of Canada as
robustness checks.
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Figure 50. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Canadian Dollar against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the price of oil
(instead of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month).
The left bottom IRF includes the trade balance of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the
output and trade balance of Canada with the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate as robustness
checks.
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Figure 51. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the output of
Canada and Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the trade balance of Canada as robustness
checks.
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Figure 52. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Short-term Interest Rate of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Japan with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the output of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the yen/euro exchange
rate and output of Japan with the short-term interest rate of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 53. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Output of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term interest rate of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the short-term interest
rate of Japan and yen/euro exchange rate with the output of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 54. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Yen against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the yen/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the trade balance of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the output and trade balance of
Japan with the yen/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 55. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the yen/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the output of Japan and
yen/euro exchange rate with the trade balance of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 56. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Short-term Interest Rate

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. short-term interest rate with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the U.K. output, and the right bottom one uses the pound/euro exchange
rate and U.K. output with the U.K. short-term interest rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 57. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the U.K. short-term interest rate, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. trade balance
and pound/euro exchange rate with the U.K. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 58. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the Exchange Rate of Pound against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the pound/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.K. trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. output and trade
balance with the pound/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 59. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional Monetary Shocks
on the U.K. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. trade balance rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the pound/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the pound/euro exchange
rate and U.K. output with the U.K. trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 60. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of the Euro against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the euro/USD exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the Euro-area trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the output and trade
balance of Euro-area with the euro/USD exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 61. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Euro-Area Central Bank Assets

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area central bank assets with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the VIX, and the right bottom one uses the VIX and euro/USD exchange
rate with the Euro-area central bank assets as robustness checks.
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Figure 62. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Euro-Area Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the Euro-area trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the euro/USD exchange rate,
and trade balance of Euro-area with the Euro-area output as robustness checks.
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Figure 63. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Euro-Area Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Euro-area trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the euro/USD exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the euro/USD exchange
rate and Euro-area output with the Euro-area trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 64. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the VIX

Notes: The first IRF estimates the VIX with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the Euro-area central bank assets, and the right bottom one uses the Euro-area central
bank assets and the euro/USD exchange rate with the VIX as robustness checks.
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Figure 65. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Short-term Interest Rate of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Canada with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the trade balance of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the trade balance
and output of Canada with the short-term interest rate of Canada as robustness checks.
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Figure 66. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Output of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian
dollar/USD exchange rate and trade balance of Canada with the Canadian output as robustness
checks.
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Figure 67. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Canadian dollar against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Canadian dollar/USD exchange rate with the price of oil
(instead of GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
The left bottom IRF includes the Canadian output, and the right bottom one uses the output and
trade balance of Canada with the Canadian dollar/USD exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 68. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the short-term interest rate of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian
output of Canada and the short-term interest rate of Canada with the Canadian trade balance as
robustness checks.
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Figure 69. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Central Bank Assets of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the central bank assets of Japan with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the trade balance of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the yen/USD
exchange rate and trade balance of Japan with central bank assets of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 70. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Output of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the yen/USD exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the yen/USD exchange rate
and trade balance of Japan with the output of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 71. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Yen against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the yen/USD exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the Japanese trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the output and trade
balance of Japan with the yen/USD exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 72. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes central bank assets of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the yen/USD exchange
rate and central bank assets of Japan with the trade balance of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 73. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on U.K. Central Bank Assets

Notes: The first IRF estimates U.K. central bank assets with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.K. trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. trade balance and
U.K. output with U.K. central bank assets as robustness checks.
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Figure 74. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.K. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the pound/USD exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the pound/USD exchange
rate and U.K. trade balance with the U.K. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 75. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Pound against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF estimates the pound/USD exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the U.K. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. output and trade
balance with the pound/USD exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 76. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.K. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes U.K. central bank assets, and the right bottom one uses the pound/USD exchange rate
and U.K. output with the U.K. trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 77. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of U.S. Dollar against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the USD/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the VIX, and the right bottom one uses the U.S. output and VIX with the USD/euro
exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 78. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on U.S. Central Bank Assets

Notes: The first IRF estimates U.S. central bank assets with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.S. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.S. output and VIX with U.S.
central bank assets as robustness checks.
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Figure 79. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.S. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates U.S. central bank assets with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.S. central bank assets, and the right bottom one uses the USD/euro exchange
rate and VIX with the U.S. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 80. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.S. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.S. trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the USD/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the USD/euro exchange rate
and U.S. output with U.S. central bank assets as robustness checks.
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Figure 81. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the VIX

Notes: The first IRF estimates the VIX with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the USD/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the USD/euro exchange rate
and U.S. output with the VIX as robustness checks.
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Figure 82. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Short-term Interest Rate of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Canada with the price of oil (instead
of GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the output of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian
dollar/euro exchange rate and output of Canada with the short-term interest rate of Canada as
robustness checks.
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Figure 83. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Output of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the short-term interest rate of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the Canadian
dollar/euro exchange rate and trade balance of Canada with the output of Canada as robustness
checks.
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Figure 84. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Canadian Dollar against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the price of oil
(instead of GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month).
The left bottom IRF includes the trade balance of Canada, and the right bottom one uses the
output and trade balance of Canada with the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate as robustness
checks.
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Figure 85. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Canada with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the output of
Canada and Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with trade balance of Canada as robustness
checks.
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Figure 86. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Central Bank Assets of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the central bank assets of Japan with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left
bottom IRF includes the output of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the Japanese trade
balance and output of Japan with the central bank assets of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 87. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Output of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the output of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the central bank assets of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the yen/euro exchange
rate and central bank assets of Japan with the output of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 88. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Yen against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the yen/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the trade balance of Japan, and the right bottom one uses the output and trade balance of
Japan with the yen/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 89. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF estimates the trade balance of Japan with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the yen/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the yen/euro exchange
rate and output of Japan with the trade balance of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 90. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on U.K. Central Bank Assets

Notes: The first IRF estimates U.K. central bank assets with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in
the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.K. trade balance, and the right bottom one uses the pound/euro exchange rate
and U.K. trade balance with U.K. central bank assets as robustness checks.
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Figure 91. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.K. Output

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. output with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes the pound/euro exchange rate, and the right bottom one uses the pound/euro exchange
rate and U.K. trade balance with the U.K. output as robustness checks.
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Figure 92. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Pound against the Euro

Notes: The first IRF estimates the pound/euro exchange rate with the price of oil (instead of GPI)
in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom
IRF includes the U.K. output, and the right bottom one uses the U.K. output and U.K. trade
balance with the pound/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 93. The Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Unconventional Monetary
Shocks on the U.K. Trade Balance

Notes: The first IRF estimates the U.K. trade balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The left bottom IRF
includes U.K. central bank assets, and the right bottom one uses the pound/euro exchange rate
and U.K. output with the U.K. trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 94. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks on the FFR

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method (with 2 lags) in which the FFR was
estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the FFR with the price of oil (instead of
GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month), but fails from
the autocorrelation test when the lag length equals 2 (so lag length equals 3). The right bottom
IRF includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index (instead of GPI) with the FFR (lag length equals 2)
as robustness checks.
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Figure 95. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method (with 1 lag) in which the Japanese
trade balance was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the Japanese trade
balance with the price of oil (instead of GPI) in the conventional monetary policy period (from
1999 up to the 30th month), but fails from the autocorrelation test when the lag length equals 1
(so lag length equals 2). The right bottom IRF includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index (instead
of GPI) with the trade balance of Japan (lag length equals 1) as robustness checks.
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Figure 96. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks on the Short-term Interest Rate of Japan

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method (with 2 lags) in which the short-term
interest rate of Japan as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left
bottom IRF estimates the short-term interest rate of Japan with the price of oil in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month), but fails from the
autocorrelation test when the lag length equals 2 (so lag length equals 3). The right bottom IRF
includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index (instead of GPI) with the short-term interest rate of
Japan (lag length equals 2) as robustness checks.
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Figure 97. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A.
Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the U.S. Output

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method (with 1 lag) in which the U.S. output
as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
U.S. output with the price of oil (lag length equals to 1) in the unconventional monetary policy
period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF includes the Industrial Inputs
Price Index (instead of GPI) with the U.S. output, but fails from the autocorrelation test when the
lag length equals 1 (so lag length equals 2).
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Figure 98. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A. Conventional
Monetary Shocks on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the Canadian trade balance
as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
Canadian trade balance with the price of oil in the conventional monetary policy period (from
1999 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index
(instead of GPI) with the Canadian trade balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 99. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S.
Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Euro-area Output

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the Euro-area output as the
only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the Euroarea output with the price of oil in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to
the 30th month). The right bottom IRF includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index (instead of GPI)
with the Euro-area output as robustness checks.
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Figure 100. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S.
Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Output of Canada

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the Canadian output as the
only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
Canadian output with the price of oil in the unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009
up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF includes the Industrial Inputs Price Index (instead of
GPI) with the Canadian output as robustness checks.
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Figure 101. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the trade balance of Japan as
the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The above right bottom IRF estimates
the Japanese trade balance with central bank assets of Japan in the unconventional monetary
policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The bottom left bottom IRF includes the
Japanese output, and the right bottom IRF estimates the yen/USD exchange rate with the trade
balance of Japan as robustness checks.
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Figure 102. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Canadian Dollar against Euro

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the Canadian dollar/euro
exchange rate as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF
estimates the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate with the Canadian output and trade balance in
the conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF
includes the Canadian output and short-term interest rate of Canada with the Canadian
dollar/euro exchange rate as robustness checks.
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Figure 103. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Trade Balance of Canada

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the Canadian trade balance
as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
trade balance of Canada with the Canadian dollar/euro exchange rate and Canadian output in the
conventional monetary policy period (from 1999 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF
includes the output of Canada and short-term interest rate of Canada with the Canadian trade
balance as robustness checks.
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Figure 104. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of E.A.
Conventional Monetary Shocks on the Trade Balance of Japan

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the trade balance of Japan as
the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
trade balance of Japan with the yen/euro exchange rate and central bank assets of Japan in the
unconventional monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF
includes the yen/euro exchange rate and output of Japan with the trade balance of Japan as
robustness checks.
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Figure 105. The Main Results and Robustness Checks for the Effect of U.S.
Unconventional Monetary Shocks on the Exchange Rate of Yen against the U.S. Dollar

Notes: The first IRF shows the results of marginal method in which the yen/USD exchange rate
as the only international variable was estimated with the GPI. The left bottom IRF estimates the
euro/USD exchange rate with the output and trade balance of Japan in the unconventional
monetary policy period (from 2009 up to the 30th month). The right bottom IRF includes the
trade balance of and central bank assets of Japan with the yen/USD exchange rate as robustness
checks.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I showed that safe haven behavior is an
important explanation for the performance of USD and euro. Safe haven behavior appears to be
an investment strategy in the face of global uncertainty. The Great Recession serves as a perfect
candidate to test safe haven behavior. I observed significant impact of safe haven flows in the
movements of the nominal U.S. dollar and euro exchange rates when I also control for relevant
macroeconomic fundamentals. I found that the USD and euro qualify as safe haven currencies
when the market uncertainty originates in the U.S, because as revealed in the first two chapters,
the VIX has a positive and significant impact on the values of USD and euro. I showed that the
VSTOXX, however, does not have any significant impact on the value of USD during the Great
Recession and afterwards in the first chapter of this dissertation. In the second chapter, my
results implied that global investors move away from the euro when the European market
uncertainty is high, because there is a negative and significant relationship between the euro and
VSTOXX. I also showed that world investors use the euro as a safe haven only in cash (as the
positive and significant coefficient on the VIX suggests from Table 2.3), because there was no
significant impact of the European stock market on the euro-denominated possible safe haven
assets (Table 2.6). On the other hand, the findings of my first chapter suggested that VSTOXX
futures, the one-year T-bill, five-year T-Note and twenty-year T-Bond are other safe haven
possibilities for investors if the S&P 500 Index performs lower return than the first-percentagequantile of its return distribution. The results of first two chapters imply that the USD was
stronger in terms of being safe haven currency, because investors used the euro only in cash.
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In the last chapter of this dissertation, I investigated the influence of the monetary policy
behavior of the US and the Euro area (EA) on their monetary policy actions since the advent of
the euro as the single currency. Following Kim’s (2001) methodology, I explored the
transmission of largest central banks’ monetary policy decisions on each other, and other G7
economies (Canada, Japan, and the UK). The results of this chapter show that US was the origin
of conventional monetary policy shocks (1999-2008), because the non-US G7 economies pursue
an endogenous monetary policy response following a U.S. conventional monetary policy shock
before the Great Recession. This finding implies that US is still the origin of monetary policy
shocks during the current conventional monetary policy period (2015-2020).
I also demonstrated that Euro-area unconventional monetary policy shocks cause an
endogenous reaction in the monetary authorities of US, UK, and Japan. My dissertation, thus,
provides some significant evidence to suggest that the Euro area has been successful in terms of
becoming a counterpart to the US during unconventional monetary policies period (2009-2015),
a motivating factor for the construction of the monetary union and common currency. The
findings of this third chapter demonstrate that being the European counterpart to the US was not
existed before the Great Recession.
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